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Ticket Summary Status Owner Type Priority Milestone
#8500 Warn the user about possible transparent proxying failure new n8fr8 defect major
Description

The transparent proxying feature is very likely to fail for a number of reasons, the most common is lack of a firmware supporting the needed iptables magic, or bugs like #3595.

Currently orbot doesn't warn the user when this occurs, leading to a false sense of security.

  • It only mentions "(Requires root)" in the settings menu: true, but not enough: a special firmware is required too. It should be mentioned (possibly with a link to https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en )
  • At orbot startup, a system notification message is issued, saying that transparent proxying has been correctly enabled, even when this is not the case!

Orbot should check more toroughly if transparent proxying is really working, and issue a BIG WARNING in the user interface if this is not the case (or if this can not be detected).

Also the web page at https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en could be improved, though it mentions the requirement for a suitable firmware, the warning could be made more evident (now you have to read the fine print to find out about this limitation).

We could also suggest the user to always check if a particular app is behaving as expected, for example checking the current network connections using a netstat-like tool like Os monitor (see: http://f-droid.org/repository/browse/?fdfilter=os%20monitor&fdid=com.eolwral.osmonitor )

#8511 Firefox caches proxy settings per hosts new mikeperry defect normal
Description

It turns out Firefox now caches proxy settings per host.

This causes us problems when people reconfigure their proxy settings, and also during startup when we change our proxy settings based on the environment variables from Vidalia. This change in proxy settings sometimes happens after the browser has already attempted to connect to check.torproject.org for the HTTPS-Everywhere Tor test, which then causes check.torproject.org to forever use the old proxy settings.

#8512 Torbutton ports and banned_ports inconsistent (tbb 2.3.25-5) new defect critical TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

Earlier versions of Tor defaulted to 9050 and 9051 and Firefox was instructed to not allow http fetches on these ports with the following config:

extensions.torbutton.banned_ports

Version 2.2.25-5 defaults to 9150 and 9151 but it fails to enter these ports in the "banned_ports" entry.

#8528 Investigate failure of test_async_notification_404.js and fix it new cypherpunks defect normal
Description

That one is not fixed with ESR 17.0.4 and rev a0215802846726e58edb2f875a06083c0d1b83a3

#8534 [CHROME] Cookies can bleed to/from incognito mode new pde defect normal
Description

This would be an urgent bug, except for the fact that HTTPS Everywhere does not run in Chrome's incognito mode unless the user manually enables it in about:extensions.

Bram reported seeing google login state bleeding across the incognito/normal boundary.

We need to repro this, check whether it's specific to Google (Chrome has its own notion of "logged in", so that might be relevant), and fix.

#8538 when torbutton is enabled, one cannot move/change icons/bookmarks/etc with recent FF version new defect major
Description

Hi.

I've seen that some similar issues are/were open... but they looked a bit different or were closed already.

With current FF versions (at least since say FF17), whenever Torbutton is enabled, one cannot move/change any bookmarks in the bookmark manager, or any icons in the tool or status bars (when selecting "Customize").

Cheers, Chris.

FF versions, at least since 17 up to including 19.0.2 Torbutton 1.4.6.3 from Debian sid.

#8546 Make a copy-able connection-config type to limit copy burden of isolation flags, etc new defect normal Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Description

Right now, an increasingly large number of fields and flags are duplicated between port_cfg_t, listener_connection_t, and (say) entry_connection_t. Every field we add here needs to be added to every one of those types, and needs to be explicitly copied from each to the next during construction time.

It would make this code much more maintainable if there were a type that we just copied from object to object here.

#8547 ooni: debug scapytest template accepted isis defect normal
Description

Several of the nettests for ooni should be using the scapy template. The last time I tried using it, it broke all my tests, and so i rewrote the tests without using.

hellais has requested that I debug the scapy test template and attempt to rewrite the tests again.

#8557 Audit and possibly enable safebrowsing new mikeperry defect major
Description

TBB currently disables safebrowsing. I would like to answer the following questions before we enable it:

  1. Does Firefox stop fetching safebrowsing data if the browser is inactive? The spec says the list is updated every 30 minutes, but doesn't say anything about user activity.
  2. The data itself is authenticated, but it is also served over HTTP, and the protocol supports requesting specific lists and segments. This introduces the ability of exits to repeatedly block list segments in an attempt to create a supercookie in the client that appears like it can persist for up to 6 hours (based on the retry behavior in https://wiki.mozilla.org/Phishing_Protection:_Design_Documentation#Client_Backoff). Is there a way for exits/websites to read this supercookie at will?
  3. Related: Should we clear the safebrowsing list data on New Identity (or does this just cause a lot of pointless network overhead)?
  4. Clearing the list data might also cause an immediate re-download of all lists and segments. Does it? Do we care about leaking this to the exit (who can then infer that we just clicked New Identity)?
  5. It looks like we definitely would need to clear the MAC key on New Identity. How do we do that? Does doing so invalidate our previous list data?
#8560 100% CPU usage in Tor Browser? new mikeperry defect major
Description

Jake and Aaron both report occasional 100% CPU usage in Tor Browser, even with Javascript disabled. I've seen the thing randomly use a lot of CPU, but it usually calms down for me after I close the offending tab..

If we can figure out how to reproduce this, we can perhaps start by bisecting either our patches, or addons?

#8564 Newnym - HS is unavailable new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

When hammering upon a HS at a continuous parrellism level (10 in this case), signal newym generates these immediately until the HS is available. I think the handler would be better to hold these connections open until there's a circuit to the HS up, or its creation fails. Instead of dropping them while HS resolution/circuiting is in progress.

[notice] Closing stream for '[scrubbed].onion': hidden service is unavailable (try again later).

libtorsocks(17006): SOCKS V5 connect failed: 04:41:02 libtorsocks(17006): Host unreachable

app: connection to onion failed: No route to host

#8570 AppCrash_vidalia.exe new chiiph defect critical TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

Hello, i have very often when i close Tor a AppCrash_vidalia.exe In my Windows\WER\ReportQueue folder i have always 5 dokuments when it crashed. a "hdmp" a "mdmp" a "txt" a "wer" and a "xml" file you need a file or all of this to analyse the crash? Or is there another way to i can help the tor team to analyse this?

#8575 Integ tests segfault python 3 new atagar defect normal
Description

Both stem's unit and integration tests presently pass under the python 3.x series. However, when the integration tests are finished running python spews a dump and segfaults...

*** glibc detected *** python3: munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer: 0x0a1ca610 ***
======= Backtrace: =========
/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x6f751)[0x302751]
/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x6fefe)[0x302efe]
python3(main+0x19e)[0x805c08e]
/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe7)[0x2a9e37]
python3[0x805be51]
======= Memory map: ========
00110000-00117000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037079    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/librt-2.13.so
00117000-00118000 r--p 00006000 08:05 6037079    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/librt-2.13.so
00118000-00119000 rw-p 00007000 08:05 6037079    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/librt-2.13.so
00119000-0011b000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451724    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/grp.cpython-33m.so
0011b000-0011c000 r--p 00001000 00:13 3451724    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/grp.cpython-33m.so
0011c000-0011d000 rw-p 00002000 00:13 3451724    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/grp.cpython-33m.so
0011d000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451742    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_posixsubprocess.cpython-33m.so
00120000-00121000 r--p 00002000 00:13 3451742    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_posixsubprocess.cpython-33m.so
00121000-00122000 rw-p 00003000 00:13 3451742    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_posixsubprocess.cpython-33m.so
00122000-00135000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6030228    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.3.4
00135000-00136000 r--p 00012000 08:05 6030228    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.3.4
00136000-00137000 rw-p 00013000 08:05 6030228    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1.2.3.4
00137000-0013a000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451722    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/fcntl.cpython-33m.so
0013a000-0013b000 r--p 00002000 00:13 3451722    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/fcntl.cpython-33m.so
0013b000-0013c000 rw-p 00003000 00:13 3451722    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/fcntl.cpython-33m.so
0013c000-00140000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451766    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/binascii.cpython-33m.so
00140000-00141000 r--p 00003000 00:13 3451766    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/binascii.cpython-33m.so
00141000-00142000 rw-p 00004000 00:13 3451766    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/binascii.cpython-33m.so
00142000-00147000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451740    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_csv.cpython-33m.so
00147000-00148000 r--p 00004000 00:13 3451740    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_csv.cpython-33m.so
00148000-0014a000 rw-p 00005000 00:13 3451740    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_csv.cpython-33m.so
0014a000-001ef000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451720    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/unicodedata.cpython-33m.so
001ef000-001f0000 r--p 000a4000 00:13 3451720    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/unicodedata.cpython-33m.so
001f0000-00206000 rw-p 000a5000 00:13 3451720    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/unicodedata.cpython-33m.so
00206000-0020c000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037082    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnss_compat-2.13.so
0020c000-0020d000 r--p 00005000 08:05 6037082    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnss_compat-2.13.so
0020d000-0020e000 rw-p 00006000 08:05 6037082    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnss_compat-2.13.so
0020e000-00221000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037076    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnsl-2.13.so
00221000-00222000 r--p 00012000 08:05 6037076    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnsl-2.13.so
00222000-00223000 rw-p 00013000 08:05 6037076    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnsl-2.13.so
00223000-00225000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 
00225000-0022f000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037070    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnss_files-2.13.so
0022f000-00230000 r--p 00009000 08:05 6037070    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnss_files-2.13.so
00230000-00231000 rw-p 0000a000 08:05 6037070    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libnss_files-2.13.so
00239000-00255000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037078    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.13.so
00255000-00256000 r--p 0001b000 08:05 6037078    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.13.so
00256000-00257000 rw-p 0001c000 08:05 6037078    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.13.so
0028f000-00291000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037071    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libutil-2.13.so
00291000-00292000 r--p 00001000 08:05 6037071    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libutil-2.13.so
00292000-00293000 rw-p 00002000 08:05 6037071    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libutil-2.13.so
00293000-003f4000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037086    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.13.so
003f4000-003f5000 ---p 00161000 08:05 6037086    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.13.so
003f5000-003f7000 r--p 00161000 08:05 6037086    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.13.so
003f7000-003f8000 rw-p 00163000 08:05 6037086    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.13.so
003f8000-003fb000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 
0040c000-00428000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451955    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_ctypes.cpython-33m.so
00428000-0042c000 r--p 0001b000 00:13 3451955    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_ctypes.cpython-33m.so
0042c000-0042f000 rw-p 0001f000 00:13 3451955    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_ctypes.cpython-33m.so
00481000-004a5000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037088    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.13.so
004a5000-004a6000 r--p 00023000 08:05 6037088    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.13.so
004a6000-004a7000 rw-p 00024000 08:05 6037088    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm-2.13.so
004ed000-004ee000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0          [vdso]
0058c000-0058e000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037081    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.13.so
0058e000-0058f000 r--p 00001000 08:05 6037081    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.13.so
0058f000-00590000 rw-p 00002000 08:05 6037081    /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl-2.13.so
005f6000-005f8000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451709    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/atexit.cpython-33m.so
005f8000-005f9000 r--p 00001000 00:13 3451709    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/atexit.cpython-33m.so
005f9000-005fa000 rw-p 00002000 00:13 3451709    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/atexit.cpython-33m.so
005fa000-0072c000 r-xp 00000000 08:05 6037050    /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8
0072c000-00734000 r--p 00132000 08:05 6037050    /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8
00734000-00743000 rw-p 0013a000 08:05 6037050    /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.8
00743000-00746000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 
007e9000-007eb000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451702    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_bisect.cpython-33m.so
007eb000-007ec000 r--p 00001000 00:13 3451702    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_bisect.cpython-33m.so
007ec000-007ed000 rw-p 00002000 00:13 3451702    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_bisect.cpython-33m.so
00834000-00837000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451758    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/termios.cpython-33m.so
00837000-00838000 r--p 00002000 00:13 3451758    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/termios.cpython-33m.so
00838000-0083a000 rw-p 00003000 00:13 3451758    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/termios.cpython-33m.so
00940000-00946000 r-xp 00000000 00:13 3451684    /home/atagar/Python-3.3.0/build/lib.linux-i686-3.3/_struct.cpython-33m.soAborted

This happens to me with both Ubuntu's python3 deb (version 3.2) and version 3.3 I compiled from source while trying to sort a similar issue out with upstream.

At this point I'm kinda resigned to the conclusion that the 3.x series is still simply somewhat unstable. As Guido once said in a presentation I attended "If you get a stacktrace then that's your problem. If you manage to get python to segfault then that's almost certainly mine."

That said, if someone wants to contact upstream and troubleshoot these latest python 3.x segfaults then the help would be greatly appreciated!

#8581 trac's useradmin plugin is horribe assigned Sebastian defect normal
Description

After using the user admin thing in trac, trac became unresponsive. I checked the load, it sat at 17 with a machine swapping heavily. Perhaps we could find a way to debug that/give the VM appropriate resources/optimize the webserver to use less ram or something?

#8585 Figure out why weechat+ssl don't play nice with torsocks assigned sysrqb defect normal
Description

weechat is socks aware, but it should also be usable with torsocks. On initial testing, weechat's irc plugin closes its connections and attempts to continue the ssl handshake on newly established conns. This could be a misinterpretation, though.

00:00:47 irc.oftc.net  -- | irc: connecting to server irc.oftc.net/6697 (SSL)...
00:01:20 irc.oftc.net =!= | irc: TLS handshake failed
00:01:20 irc.oftc.net =!= | irc: error: The TLS connection was non-properly terminated.
00:01:20 irc.oftc.net  -- | irc: reconnecting to server in 10 second
Mar 25 00:00:48.000 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(): entered.
Mar 25 00:00:48.000 [debug] parse_socks(): socks5: checking request
Mar 25 00:00:48.000 [debug] parse_socks(): socks5: fqdn address type
Mar 25 00:00:48.000 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(): Client asked for irc.oftc.net:6697
...
Mar 25 00:00:49.600 [info] connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(): Sending relay cell 0 to begin stream 24137.
...
Mar 25 00:00:50.160 [debug] relay_lookup_conn(): found conn for stream 24137.
Mar 25 00:00:50.160 [debug] circuit_receive_relay_cell(): Sending to origin.
Mar 25 00:00:50.160 [debug] connection_edge_process_relay_cell(): Now seen 926 relay cells here (command 4, stream 24137).
Mar 25 00:00:50.160 [info] connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(): 'connected' received after 1 seconds.
Mar 25 00:00:50.160 [info] addressmap_register(): Temporary addressmap ('irc.oftc.net' to '140.211.166.64') not performed, since it's already mapped to '50.197.126.29'
...
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(): 12: starting, inbuf_datalen 512 (0 pending in tls object).
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] channel_queue_cell(): Directly handling incoming cell_t 0x38e973ff140 for channel 0x1e0c141140 (global ID 2)
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(): circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() returning circuit 0x1e0c22fcd0 for circ_id 3495, channel ID 2 (0x1e0c141140)
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] relay_lookup_conn(): found conn for stream 24137.
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] circuit_receive_relay_cell(): Sending to origin.
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] connection_edge_process_relay_cell(): Now seen 929 relay cells here (command 3, stream 24137).
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [info] connection_edge_process_relay_cell(): 13: end cell (closed normally) for stream 24137. Removing stream.
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(): 12: starting, inbuf_datalen 0 (0 pending in tls object).
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] conn_close_if_marked(): Cleaning up connection (fd 13).
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] connection_remove(): removing socket 13 (type Socks), n_conns now 5
Mar 25 00:01:20.280 [debug] connection_free_(): closing fd 13.
...
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_handle_listener_read(): Connection accepted on socket 13 (child of fd 6).
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_add_impl(): new conn type Socks, socket 13, address 127.0.0.1, n_conns 5.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(): entered.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] parse_socks(): socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(): socks handshake not all here yet.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(): entered.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(): socks handshake not all here yet.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(): entered.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] parse_socks(): socks5: checking request
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] parse_socks(): socks5: fqdn address type
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 13 wants to write.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] conn_read_callback(): socket 13 wants to read.
Mar 25 00:01:30.560 [debug] connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(): Client asked for irc.oftc.net:6697
Mar 25 00:01:31.000 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 13 wants to write.
...
Mar 25 00:01:31.000 [info] connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(): 'connected' received after 1 seconds.
Mar 25 00:01:31.000 [info] addressmap_register(): Temporary addressmap ('irc.oftc.net' to '140.211.166.64') not performed, since it's already mapped to '50.197.126.29'
...
Mar 25 00:01:31.000 [debug] conn_write_callback(): socket 13 wants to write.
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] conn_read_callback(): socket 13 wants to read.
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] read_to_chunk(): Encountered eof on fd 13
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [info] connection_edge_reached_eof(): conn (fd 13) reached eof. Closing.
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] connection_edge_end(): Sending end on conn (fd 13).
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit active.
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(): Made a circuit inactive.
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] conn_close_if_marked(): Cleaning up connection (fd 13).
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] connection_remove(): removing socket 13 (type Socks), n_conns now 5
Mar 25 00:01:33.440 [debug] connection_free_(): closing fd 13.

The tcpdump output is interesting too. Six of these sent less than a second apart without response from Tor before failing

        0x0020:  8018 0156 fef2 0000 0101 080a 01ea d3d5  ...V............
        0x0030:  01ea d3d4 1603 0000 c501 0000 c103 0351  ...............Q
        0x0040:  4e50 49b3 f165 b434 0a72 0e07 dafe da5f  NPI..e.4.r....._
        0x0050:  e0ab 06fb 1d07 c153 1cf4 7445 6c03 0700  .......S..tEl...
        0x0060:  0050 c02b c009 c023 c02c c00a c024 c008  .P.+...#.,...$..
        0x0070:  c02f c013 c027 c030 c014 c012 009c 002f  ./...'.0......./
        0x0080:  003c 0035 003d 0041 0084 000a 0005 0004  .<.5.=.A........
        0x0090:  009e 0033 0067 0039 006b 0045 0088 0016  ...3.g.9.k.E....
        0x00a0:  00a2 0032 0040 0038 006a 0044 0087 0013  ...2.@.8.j.D....
        0x00b0:  0066 0100 0048 0005 0005 0100 0000 00ff  .f...H..........
        0x00c0:  0100 0100 0023 0000 000a 000c 000a 0013  .....#..........
        0x00d0:  0015 0017 0018 0019 000b 0002 0100 000d  ................
        0x00e0:  001c 001a 0401 0402 0403 0501 0503 0601  ................
        0x00f0:  0603 0301 0302 0303 0201 0202 0203       ..............
#8593 Circuit build timeout not respected? needs_information mikeperry defect major Tor: 0.2.???
Description

I'm currently testing my Torperf rewrite. I noticed that a few circuit builds take far longer than the circuit-build timeout. Still, these circuit builds are not aborted and the resulting circuits get streams attached. Isn't the CBT stuff supposed to prevent just that?

Below is an example (reformatted). Notice the timestamps of the CIRC LAUNCHED and the CIRC EXTENDED event:

2013-03-26 12:57:05+0000 CIRC 176 LAUNCHED
  BUILD_FLAGS=NEED_CAPACITY PURPOSE=GENERAL
  TIME_CREATED=2013-03-26T12:57:05.992579
2013-03-26 12:58:44+0000 CIRC 176 EXTENDED
  $8BBE900C29D4B5D3FC727DB65140EA0A5EC94C19=kennkeintor
  BUILD_FLAGS=NEED_CAPACITY PURPOSE=GENERAL
  TIME_CREATED=2013-03-26T12:57:05.992579
2013-03-26 12:58:44+0000 CIRC 176 EXTENDED
  $8BBE900C29D4B5D3FC727DB65140EA0A5EC94C19=kennkeintor,
  $0AC01745501396F338291248032E77317079A02D=KandHResearchCo
  BUILD_FLAGS=NEED_CAPACITY PURPOSE=GENERAL
  TIME_CREATED=2013-03-26T12:57:05.992579
2013-03-26 12:58:45+0000 CIRC 176 EXTENDED
  $8BBE900C29D4B5D3FC727DB65140EA0A5EC94C19=kennkeintor,
  $0AC01745501396F338291248032E77317079A02D=KandHResearchCo,
  $3E5693C4B0FCD8B42153869494421164E42A9FE0=chaoscomputerclub29
  BUILD_FLAGS=NEED_CAPACITY PURPOSE=GENERAL
  TIME_CREATED=2013-03-26T12:57:05.992579
2013-03-26 12:58:45+0000 CIRC 176 BUILT
  $8BBE900C29D4B5D3FC727DB65140EA0A5EC94C19=kennkeintor,
  $0AC01745501396F338291248032E77317079A02D=KandHResearchCo,
  $3E5693C4B0FCD8B42153869494421164E42A9FE0=chaoscomputerclub29
  BUILD_FLAGS=NEED_CAPACITY PURPOSE=GENERAL
  TIME_CREATED=2013-03-26T12:57:05.992579
2013-03-26 13:01:01+0000 STREAM 379 SENTCONNECT 176
  54.242.189.124:80
2013-03-26 13:01:02+0000 STREAM 379 REMAP 176 54.242.189.124:80
  SOURCE=EXIT
2013-03-26 13:01:02+0000 STREAM 379 SUCCEEDED 176 54.242.189.124:80
2013-03-26 13:01:04+0000 STREAM 379 CLOSED 176 54.242.189.124:80
  REASON=END REMOTE_REASON=DONE
2013-03-26 13:02:09+0000 CIRC 176 CLOSED
  $8BBE900C29D4B5D3FC727DB65140EA0A5EC94C19=kennkeintor,
  $0AC01745501396F338291248032E77317079A02D=KandHResearchCo,
  $3E5693C4B0FCD8B42153869494421164E42A9FE0=chaoscomputerclub29
  BUILD_FLAGS=NEED_CAPACITY PURPOSE=GENERAL
  TIME_CREATED=2013-03-26T12:57:05.992579 REASON=FINISHED

The CBT was around 3 seconds at that time as reported in a BUILDTIMEOUT_SET event. This is Tor version 0.2.4.9-alpha-dev (git-123daffb600cb1b5). I can easily modify and re-run this tool to gather more data if required.

#8597 Catch res_n* functions on systems that support them assigned sysrqb defect normal
Description

We should overload the res_n* functions on systems that support them. Currently we catch res_query and it's family, but not the newer res_n* set. They've been around for a while now, there are likely programs that could be trying to perform dns resolution using udp and failing.

#8615 BridgeDB and Pluggable Transports new defect normal
Description

This is a parent ticket for all BridgeDB+PTs tickets.

#8617 Missing signature for binary in /dist new erinn defect minor
Description

I noticed that win32/tor-0.2.3.25-win32.exe in current /dist lacks a signature file.

vidalia/vidalia-0.2.21.tar.gz.asc has no corresponding file.

#8620 HTTPS Everywhere breaks iplayif.com new pde defect normal
Description

iplayif.com hosts a javascript implementation of an interactive fiction interpreter.

You provide if with a URL of a "z-code" file, it fetches and interprets it.

With HTTPS-Everywhere enabled, the jQuery XHR call that fetches the file fails. Perhaps HTTPS-Everywhere tries to fetch the file using HTTPS?

Example URL: http://iplayif.com/?story=http://mirror.ifarchive.org/if-archive/games/zcode/LostPig.z8

If all goes well, you should see black-on-white text. At the moment, it shows a white-on-red error screen.

I'm using the latest Firefox Nightly, and HTTPS-Everywhere 4.0development.6

#8624 Easy way to find and block misbehaving Tor relays new chiiph defect normal
Description

There is currently no easy way for users to find and block misbehaving Tor relays. If you are using the Tor Browser and see something funny in one tab (say, SSL MITM), you will first need to figure out which circuit that maps to. Vidalia doesn't make this easy. Once you have the IP address of the relay, you will need to edit the Tor configuration file with the ExcludeNodes option and have Tor reload the config. Vidalia doesn't make this easy either.

There should be an easy way to find and block misbehaving Tor relays, either with Vidalia or arm.

#8625 Do not call networkstatus_reset_download_failures() hourly new defect normal Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Description

Once an hour, we call router_reset_descriptor_download_failures, which calls networkstatus_reset_download_failures(). This probably isn't right! Our download logic has a way to say "Try this once an hour": that's by having a download schedule with a one-hour interval. What this does is make us retry several times an hour, as if we had never failed before.

Found while investigating #4580 .

#8633 Link text overlaps with normal text making some websites unreadable new mikeperry defect critical
Description

Articles on http://huffingtonpost.com/ have link text that is missized and overlaps with normal text. The result is unreadable.

Zooming in and out fixes the text sizes.

#8636 Some bugs Yandex reopened yan defect normal HTTPS-E 3.2.2
Description

1) http://maps.yandex.ru loaded without flash and without a redirect to https://maps.yandex.ru

2) http://newmoscow.yandex.ru and https://newmoscow.yandex.ru redirects to the http://maps.yandex.ru

3) Audio & video files don't play. https://video.yandex.ru/users/pristalnaya/view/55# https://video.yandex.ru/users/crimson-tube/view/26/#

4) Upload files don't work in Yandex.Video.

#8651 Vidalia help not up to date with Trac FAQ new chiiph defect normal
Description

Vidalia help (section Troubleshoting) specifies:

You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the Tor wiki page on running <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService"> Tor as a service</a> for more information on how to remove the Tor service.

Link should be changed to

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice

#8655 replace link to gnupg.org/related_software/frontends.html new defect normal
Description

The link http://www.gnupg.org/related_software/frontends.html is confusing, perhaps even dangerous, for non-techy users who never heard about gpg.

The list starts with GUI Frontends, Cryptophane, which links to google code, which is (self-)censored in many areas. [1] The next item, Gajim, is a messenger, but can't verify files, therefore misleading. Seahorse links to sourceforge, which is also (self-)censored in many areas. [2] Seahorse is a key management gui and can't verify files...

All links lead to non-https sites. Since gettor users can't reach torproject.org it's not hard to assume, that they also can't reach any pages with encryption (gui fronted) tools, or worse, that those websites are victim of man-in-the-middle attacks spreading malicious software.

The link should point to another website, ideally HSTS or better with certificating pinning in Firefox and Chrome. Such a website has probable yet to be created. Psiphon [3] uses amazonaws.com. Using amazonaws as well would be a good compromise? (If SSL works well and censors are unlikely to censor amazonaws?)

The new list should be short, one example per operating system with a verification gui known to work is enough. And the recommended frontend should be downloadable from that page as well.

[1] Users residing in countries on the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control sanction list, including Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria [2] https://sourceforge.net/blog/clarifying-sourceforgenets-denial-of-site-access-for-certain-persons-in-accordance-with-us-law/ [3] https://s3.amazonaws.com/0ubz-2q11-gi9y/en.html

#8659 INSTALL references obsolete Makefile.cvs new ioerror defect normal
Description

It was reported to Debian (http://bugs.debian.org/704861) that torsocks' INSTALL file refers to the non-existent Makefile.cvs file.

#8660 Connection interrupted while page was loading new pde defect normal
Description

I got the following errors today (while on a page on fastmail.fm, reading my email):

Timestamp: 04/07/2013 11:48:12 PM Error: TypeError: popup is null Source File: chrome://https-everywhere/content/toolbar_button.js Line: 45

HTTPS Everywhere: no loadgroup notificationCallbacks for https://www.fastmail.fm/static/ajaxui/bootstrap-267b1180.js

Timestamp: 04/07/2013 11:48:50 PM Error: The connection to https://www.fastmail.fm/events/?u=8e404134 was interrupted while the page was loading. Source File: https://www.fastmail.fm/static/ajaxui/bootstrap-267b1180.js Line: 3

I'm using Firefox 20.0 on Fedora Linux, with HTTPS Everywhere 3.1.4.

#8666 Disable Hellebaard because of mismatching with MJOPR needs_information pde defect normal
Description

Please disable HTTPS Everywhere for hellebaard.nl and *.hellebaard.nl.

The domainname has the same IP address as mjopr.nl which has an HTTPS running but these two sites have absolutely nothing in common.

Going to (http://)hellebaard.nl in your browser will redirect you to (https://)mjopr.nl.

(Eventually one will arrive at http://mjopr.nl (non-secure) because of configuration of mjopr.nl. This has noting to do with HTTPS Everywhere but I should notice it when you test it.)

If I go to hellebaard.nl and get forwarded to mjopr.nl, this will only happen the first time. When I re-enter hellebaard.nl, I will stay there.

In order to prevent confusion and mismatching and having customers arriving at the wrong site, please add a mismatch rule for Hellebaard so that all going to hellebaard.nl and *.hellebaard.nl stay at Hellebaard (and not go to MJOPR).

#8668 WWE.com videos broken due to ruleset new pde defect normal
Description

http://www.wwe.com/videos/chris-jericho-vs-dolph-ziggler-money-in-the-bank-contract-match-raw-aug-20-2012-26047076

Brightcove (partial) causes videos to be unplayable. Disabling the rule lets them play.

#8672 Extra trailing line feed in translated string. new chiiph defect trivial
Description

Please remove the trailing "\n" from the string "Installer un relais\n" (translation of "Setup Relaying") at line #1967 of the file src/vidalia/i18n/po/fr/vidalia_fr.po

#8676 Research an HTTP pluggable transport that actually uses a browser and a web server new asn defect normal
Description

Research like www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak13parrot.pdf makes it even more clear that it's worth exploring the possibility of actually using the software you are trying to emulate. That is, if you are trying to look like Skype, you better use the Skype binary. If you want to look like HTTP, you better use a browser on the client-side and a web server on the server-side.

We should look whether we can use stuff like Webkit to write a client-side transport, and a web server like nginx or apache to write its server-side.

#8684 bwauth files don't include opinions about Authorities assigned aagbsn defect major
Description

It appears that moria1's bwauth doesn't provide an opinion about moria1, or any authority for that matter.

And no authorities provide Measured lines for turtles.

I suspect there's code in the bwauth to skip measuring authorities.

That's going to be bad now that we've turned on #8435.

The right fix might be to change the bwauths. But for now I'm filing as a Tor bug until we figure out where to fix it.

#8687 Issue with RelayBandwidthBurst handling new atagar defect minor
Description

Miłosz reports...

I think I've spotted a mistake in arm. It would seem that the RelayBandwidthBurst setting from torrc is interpreted as a rate (so a setting of 2MB is shown as 16Mbit/s, for example), but, as I've recently learned, that is not what the setting actually defines.

What it does define is something along the lines of a "credit limit" - the bandwidth bucket grows with RelayBandwidthRate until it hits RelayBandwidthBurst. It is the maximum amount of data that can be transferred in a single "burst", rather than the maximum bandwidth. For a less incompetent explanation than my own, see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3630#comment:14

This seems to be a common misconception within the tor community (even to the point where some comments in tor's source code indicate it!).
#8689 Periodically verify signatures in /dist new defect normal
Description

Give the recent bad signatures of some files in /dist that only came to light after a user emailed helpdesk, I wrote a bash script that I now run periodically on my dist mirror to verify the signatures. I think it's not a bad idea to run it on tpo.org as well.

As first argument, it takes the path to /dist. It uses a local independent public keyring I update from time to time. That path must be customized in the script.

It currently excludes /dist/manual because that contains unsigned copies of the user manual.

#8695 GVFS metadata file contains TBB filename (Debian Linux) new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle on Debian Linux showed that the file ~/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/home contains the filename of the Tor Browser Bundle tarball: tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-2.3.25-5-dev-en-US.tar.gz.

The same file on my personal Debian system does not contain the tarball filename, but does contain names of files I have accessed recently or in the past.

The reports I have read suggest you can delete the contents with no ill effect. Maybe this is something we should consider?

#8696 .xsession-errors file contains Tor Browser related warning (Debian Linux) new erinn defect major
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle on Debian Linux showed that the file ~/.xsession-errors contains a Tor Browser related warning: Window manager warning: Buggy client sent a _NET_ACTIVE_WINDOW message with a timestamp of 0 for 0x3800089 (Tor Browse)”. It is worth noting that a file named ~/.xsession-errors.old could also exist.

#8697 .bash_history contains traces of TBB use (Debian Linux) new erinn defect normal
Description

Linux users who run the Tor Browser Bundle from the command line will leave traces in the .bash_history file. Is there anything we can do in this case?

#8706 .recently-used.xbel contains TBB filename (Debian Linux) new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle on Debian Linux (#8166) showed that the file ~/.recently-used.xbel contains the filename of the Tor Browser Bundle tarball: tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86_64-2.3.25-5-dev-en-US.tar.gz, as well as the time and date it was added, modified, and visited.

#8707 GVFS metadata file contains traces of TBB being deleted (Debian Linux) new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle on Debian Linux (#8166) showed that the file /home/runa/.local/share/gvfs-metadata/home-c0ca7993.log contains lines indicating that the Tor Browser Bundle was deleted: /.local/share/Trash/expunged/3864782161/Docs/Vidalia/CREDITS, /.local/share/Trash/expunged/3864782161/start-tor-browser, /.local/share/Trash/expunged/3864782161/App/tor, and so on.

#8712 Authorities should not vote against Fast just because they vote against Running new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

Non-active relays get stripped of their Fast flag, even if the bwauth measurements put them above the Fast threshold.

Seems to me that if enough other authorities find the relay to be Running, we shouldn't be voting against giving him the Fast flag.

Probably same with other flags like Guard, Stable, and Exit.

#8718 memory leak whenever a config change happens needs_review defect normal Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Description
==10870== 10 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 27
==10870==    at 0x4C28BED: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263)
==10870==    by 0x5FDEB41: strdup (strdup.c:43)
==10870==    by 0x22111D: tor_strdup_ (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1B8C04: config_get_assigned_option (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1B580A: set_options (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1B70FC: options_trial_assign (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1D3FCD: control_setconf_helper (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1D7584: connection_control_process_inbuf (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1C11CC: connection_handle_read (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x11DEA0: conn_read_callback (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x52D8CCB: event_base_loop (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.7)
==10870==    by 0x11E834: do_main_loop (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870== 
==10870== 42 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 13 of 27
==10870==    at 0x4C28BED: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263)
==10870==    by 0x220DE7: tor_malloc_ (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x216DF2: smartlist_join_strings2 (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1B8C9A: config_get_assigned_option (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1B580A: set_options (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1B70FC: options_trial_assign (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1D3FCD: control_setconf_helper (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1D7584: connection_control_process_inbuf (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x1C11CC: connection_handle_read (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x11DEA0: conn_read_callback (in /usr/sbin/tor)
==10870==    by 0x52D8CCB: event_base_loop (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.7)
==10870==    by 0x11E834: do_main_loop (in /usr/sbin/tor)
#8719 memory leak when we get a consensus but don't have enough certs to check it needs_review defect normal Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Description
==8808== 685,222 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 28 of 28
==8808==    at 0x4C28BED: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64
-linux.so)
==8808==    by 0x5FDEB41: strdup (strdup.c:43)
==8808==    by 0x22114D: tor_strdup_ (util.c:240)
==8808==    by 0x1275A0: networkstatus_set_current_consensus (networkstatus.c:1718)
==8808==    by 0x1E555B: connection_dir_client_reached_eof (directory.c:1875)
==8808==    by 0x1E6F28: connection_dir_reached_eof (directory.c:2311)
==8808==    by 0x1C1496: connection_handle_read (connection.c:4119)
==8808==    by 0x11DEA0: conn_read_callback (main.c:718)
==8808==    by 0x52D8CCB: event_base_loop (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5.1.7)
==8808==    by 0x11E834: do_main_loop (main.c:1980)
==8808==    by 0x12001D: tor_main (main.c:2696)
==8808==    by 0x5F7CEAC: (below main) (libc-start.c:228)
#8721 Cox account admin broken assigned micahlee defect normal
Description

There is a website I use that is broken because of HTTPS Everywhere. It is http://ww2.cox.com/myconnection/home.cox When HTTPS Everywhere is on I can't log into my account. Sorry I'm not super specific with the version, keywords, etc... But I'm not sure what those are...

#8723 Trying to create a hidden service on Mac OS X 10.7 new chiiph defect major
Description

Take a gander here, it explains most of it: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/16073922/cant-seem-to-get-a-tor-hidden-service-running-with-vidailia

No matter what I do, Vidalia does not seem to find a suitable folder. WIndows installation went like a breeze.

Please help!

#8725 resource:// URIs leak information new mikeperry defect major
Description

Here's a bug in Firefox that may be able to identify users of Tor Browser Bundle:

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=863246

#8727 ServerTransportListenAddr validation could be better new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

Someone put in his torrc:

ServerTransportListenAddr obfs2,obfs3 0.0.0.0:56831 0.0.0.0:56832

inspired by the format of ServerTransportPlugin. Unfortunately, this is not the correct way to use ServerTransportListenAddr. The correct way is:

ServerTransportListenAddr obfs2 0.0.0.0:56831
ServerTransportListenAddr obfs3 0.0.0.0:56832

We should at least validate that the first argument of the line is a pluggable transport name (C-identifier) to avoid stuff like "obfs2,obfs3".

#8734 Decide which (if any) VKontakte ruleset is best new MB defect normal
Description

We have two different rulesets for VKontakte (VK), one in stable and one in master. We should do some testing with VK users and figure out which of these we want to use or whether there's an appropriate way to combine the two of them.

#8736 gitweb.tpo hidden service offline new defect normal
Description

The gitweb.tpo hidden service http://xqzqgitytlyl5ffw.onion/ (or https://xqzqgitytlyl5ffw.onion/) (#3425) is offline.

#8739 Amazon.com "edit reviews" reported broken new pde defect normal
Description

Per e-mail:

When clicking an "edit review" link on Amazon, the page constantly loads and never reaches the destination. Thought you guys might want to know.

#8742 Byte history leaks information about local usage/hidden services new defect major Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Description

Not sure if this is related to #516.

When acting as a relay, Tor seems to collect and report on *all* incoming and outgoing bandwidth. This data is then published publicly on Atlas, torstatus, or available for download.

As an example, if you look at the monthly graph, it's pretty clear this relay become "something more than a relay" around the 7th of April: https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/85617CE64344948B0BAC23CD4E22245F7F66C1C8

An attacker could use this data to determine if a relay hosts a hidden service (generally more bytes written than read), or if a user was actively browsing/downloading (more bytes read, generally) during a certain period of time. An active attacker could then create a large amount of traffic to a hidden service, perhaps creating a known pattern of high traffic followed by a period of little traffic, then review the byte history again and look for any relays that displayed a difference of read/write similar to the generated traffic. Having narrowed down the candidates, a DDOS of the relay would provide confirmation.  Exposing clients would of course be far more difficult, as most probably do not run as a relay.

Possible solutions: *By default, don't count any traffic to/from a hidden service. Could be enabled optionally in torrc... if someone really wanted it.

*By default, don't count any traffic beginning at tor's socks port. I can't think of any reason someone would want to enable this... but if there is a good argument for it, perhaps provide an option in torrc for this too.

*Most drastically... let a user opt out of reporting byte history completely. I'm guessing this is a "no go", since the stats are needed to help better network performance.

#8744 The show_msg() does not save correctly the errno value new ioerror defect normal
Description

The "show_msg" function tries to save the errno of the caller but there are multiple call sites *before* that can override the errno value.

This was actually the cause of some other bugs in the past, one being https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8043.

I think the best way to deal with this issue is for the caller to make sure errno is saved. In some situations, we might NOT want this function to restore a previous errno so it should not set it.

#8745 Add thread safe support with documentation new ioerror defect normal
Description

At the moment, torsocks does not seems to be thread safe so this would be a nice feature to have but in the meantime, it should be documented for the user to understand the limitations.

#8746 Tor tries to kill nonexistent proxy PID on second SIGINT new defect normal Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Description

This is what 180-pluggable-transport.txt says about proxies and SIGINT:

Proxies should respond to a single INT signal by closing their listener ports and not accepting any new connections, but keeping all connections open, then terminating when connections are all closed. Proxies should respond to a second INT signal by shutting down cleanly.

I implemented the websocket-server transport to work as specified: https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git/blob/c23caf1f71f8281319cadf55002723dbcd333905:/websocket-transport/websocket-server.go#l238 I noticed unexpected behavior when the proxy receives a SIGINT, and doesn't have any open connection, and so exits immediately without waiting for a second SIGINT. The parent tor process tries to kill a nonexistent PID:

^CApr 19 17:58:59.000 [notice] Interrupt: we have stopped accepting new connections, and will shut down in 30 seconds. Interrupt again to exit now.
^CApr 19 17:59:05.000 [notice] SIGINT received a second time; exiting now.
Apr 19 17:59:05.000 [notice] Failed to terminate process with PID '18277' ('No such process').

The PID might have been reclaimed in the meantime, and tor could be killing an unrelated process.

(Originally from https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-April/004679.html.)

#8751 do something about TLS HELLO gmt_unix_time new mikeperry defect major
Description

Assumptions

When not using Tor...

  • For example, when using wget or Firefox, the user's ISP and destination server can watch TLS hello and thus learn about the client's clock.
  • Many updaters in background are also using TLS.

When using Tor...

  • For example, when using TBB, Tor exit nodes, the ISP's of Tor exit nodes and destination servers can see client's clock.

These are the assumptions. [3] Please tell me if they are wrong.

Problem

NTP server admins can willingly or if their server gets compromised and any man-in-the-middle can tamper with NTP replies and therefore introduce a unique clock skew.

Almost no one is using authenticated NTP, because there are no instructions in a forum or blog how to enable NTP authentication. Therefore almost everyone uses standard configuration and is at risk.

Also due to a clock defect, low battery, clock can skew without tampering with NTP.

Since the browser [1] transmits it in TLS HELLO (gmt_unix_time), it can be used to track individual users. For example, a clock skew of +/-30 minutes may not worry the user ("That damn clock is wrong again. I use my watch instead.") but could identify the user even when using Tor.

Also adversaries who didn't introduce the clock skew could use it to identify users. If the user visits a website under adversary control 2 without Tor for some non-anonymous activity, it knows the clock skew. Later, if the user visits another website under adversary control, it can see the same clock skew, which is at least a strong anonymity set reduction.

Solution

RFC 5245 says.

Clocks are not required to be set correctly by the basic TLS protocol;

So perhaps get ride of it entirely (replace it with some fixed time)?

higher-level or application protocols may define additional requirements.

Whatever that means.

Implementation

I have no idea.

Related

#3059

Footnotes

[1] Also #1517 "Provide JS with reduced time precision" wouldn't help much, since it wouldn't do something about bigger clock skews. [2] Nowadays with services like google analytics and facebook like button, there are servers which are present on a high percentage of all websites. [3] Haven't used wireshark, but read http://www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html and http://wiki.wireshark.org/SSL.

#8754 Remove mentions of code.google.com new ioerror defect normal
Description

./README ./src/torsocks.c ./test/expectedresults.txt

#8766 Tor never recovers when started with skewed clock new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

How to reproduce...

Start Tor with a skewed clock. For example, +/- one week.

Tor will detect, that the clock is skewed.

Received directory with skewed time (server '...'):
It seems that our clock is ahead by 6 days, 23 hours,
59 minutes, or that theirs is behind. Tor requires an
accurate clock to work: please check your time,
timezone, and date settings.

I learned some more directory information, but not
enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable
consensus.

Then reset clock back to correct time. Tor will also detect that.

Your system clock just jumped 604800 seconds backward;
assuming established circuits no longer work.

Result:

Tor still won't work (no connections possible).

Expected result:

Tor recovers and can now connect.

Version:

getinfo version: 250-version=0.2.3.25 (git-3fed5eb096d2d187) (On Debian Wheezy.)

#8768 Tor Cloud documentation not up to date new runa defect normal
Description

I have set up a new Tor Cloud instance and there is a screen for Storage Device Configuration not found on https://cloud.torproject.org/#get_started

#8784 Resources fail to load on IEGallery.com new pde defect normal
Description

When HTTPS Everywhere is enabled, the IE add-ons website fail to load any images and stylesheets.

http://www.iegallery.com/Addons

#8786 Add extra-info line that tracks the number of consensus downloads of each pluggable transports new defect normal Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Description

In #5040, Karsten suggested to add yet another line for measuring obfsbridge stats.

He wants a dirreq-v3-transport line with the exact same format as bridge-ip-transports, that counts consensus fetches instead of direct connections. This will improve the granularity of bridge statistics, and it will help us count users accurately in scenarios like flashproxy (where each client is actually a flashproxy bridge).

This means that we should be considering the GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS_V2 and GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS events in this case, instead of GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT.

#8787 Check return values for more unix functions new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

Reportedly, we lack checks for the return values of at least munmap, lseek, unlink. We should fix that for code-quality.

#8793 Resolve clang scan-build issues new defect normal Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Description

The clang analyzer tool "scan-build" reports a bunch of issues on current Tor master. On inspection, I believe that there's nothing harmful here. (Stuff is false-positive, or harmless, or both.) But we should nevertheless clean it all up if we can.

For extra points, we should integrate "scan-build" as part of our build hygiene process, and get jenkins to flip out when it doesn't pass error-free.

#8795 Make #8822 survivable needs_review defect normal Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Description

I have ran this instance of Tor about six times before this error. Upon getting this error it would crash after every attempt to run the Tor browser bundle. I had to delete the folder and re-extract the Tor browser bundle to get it to run again. Btw, Windows reported that tor.exe stopped running, so I reported this as a problem with Tor.

[Notice] Tor v0.2.4.12-alpha (git-91b8bc26f160f172) running on Windows 7 with Libevent 2.0.21-stable and OpenSSL 1.0.0k. [Notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning [Notice] This version is not a stable Tor release. Expect more bugs than usual. [Notice] Read configuration file "K:\Router\Tor Browser\Data\Tor\torrc". [Warning] You have asked to exclude certain relays from all positions in your circuits. Expect hidden services and other Tor features to be broken in unpredictable ways. [Notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 [Notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151 [Notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file .\Data\Tor\geoip. [Notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file .\Data\Tor\geoip6. [Warning] Error replacing "K:/Router/Tor Browser/Data/Tor\cached-microdescs": Permission denied [Warning] Error rebuilding microdescriptor cache: Permission denied [Notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits. [Notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network. [Notice] New control connection opened. [Error] getinfo_helper_dir(): Bug: control.c:1715: getinfo_helper_dir: Assertion md->body failed; aborting.

#8796 500 Internal Privoxity error new n8fr8 defect normal Tor: unspecified
Description

i've recently installed Orbot on my android galaxy S4, and it works on some websites but randomly when i try to access another page or website it comes up with

500 Internal Privoxy Error privoxy encountered an error while processing your request:

could not load template file forwarding - failed or one of its included components

#8808 Error on ADP iPay new pde defect normal
Description

When I log into the iPay system of ADP there is a login loop that never lets me log in. When I'm on the site (ipay.adp.com) the https everywhere icon is not in the toolbar so I have to go into chrome://extensions and disable it.

#8811 Create Vidalia package for Tor Launcher-based TBB assigned erinn defect normal
Description

Soon we will have new TBB packages that include Tor Launcher instead of Vidalia. To allow people to view their network map, etc. we want to create new Vidalia-only packages that will work with the new TBB packages. There are a few things we need to do:

1) Create and ship a vidalia.conf that is configured for cookie auth. so it can connect to the tor that is started by Tor Launcher.

2) Modify Vidalia so it will store its configuration near or within the application area (instead of in the user's home directory).

3) Create and deliver the Vidalia packages.

#8816 Video in as.com fails to load (related with brightcove ruleset) new pde defect normal
Description

Using HTTPS Everywhere from Chrome 2013.4.30

http://www.as.com/futbol/video/abucheos-mourinho-salida-valdebebas/20130502dasdasftb_5/Ves#

This video fails to load if brightcove rule is enabled.

#8837 AttributeError: 'module' object has no attribute 'to_camel_case' new atagar defect normal
Description
arm :: (master) » ./arm                                                                                                                                                                       ~/arm 1 ↵ 
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "./src/starter.py", line 478, in <module>    cli.controller.startTorMonitor(time.time() - initTime)
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/controller.py", line 564, in startTorMonitor    curses.wrapper(drawTorMonitor, startTime)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.6/curses/wrapper.py", line 43, in wrapper    return func(stdscr, *args, **kwds)
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/controller.py", line 635, in drawTorMonitor    cli.menu.menu.showMenu()
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/menu/menu.py", line 80, in showMenu    menu = cli.menu.actions.makeMenu()
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/menu/actions.py", line 27, in makeMenu    baseMenu.add(makeViewMenu())
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/menu/actions.py", line 93, in makeViewMenu
    label = " / ".join([str_tools.to_camel_case(panel.getName()) for panel in pagePanels])
AttributeError: 'module' object has no attribute 'to_camel_case'                                                                                                                                            }}}
#8838 AttributeError: 'Version' object has no attribute 'meets_requirements' new atagar defect normal
Description
arm :: (master) » ./arm                                                                                                                                                                            ~/arm  
Traceback (most recent call last):  File "./src/starter.py", line 478, in <module>
    cli.controller.startTorMonitor(time.time() - initTime)
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/controller.py", line 564, in startTorMonitor
    curses.wrapper(drawTorMonitor, startTime)  File "/usr/lib/python2.6/curses/wrapper.py", line 43, in wrapper
    return func(stdscr, *args, **kwds)  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/controller.py", line 618, in drawTorMonitor
    control.redraw(False)  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/controller.py", line 346, in redraw
    panelImpl.redraw(force)  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/util/panel.py", line 405, in redraw
    self.draw(self.maxX, self.maxY)  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/cli/torrcPanel.py", line 178, in draw
    corrections = dict((lineNum, (issue, msg)) for lineNum, issue, msg in loadedTorrc.getCorrections())
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/util/torConfig.py", line 797, in getCorrections
    skipValidation |= (torVersion is None or not torVersion.meets_requirements(stem.version.Requirement.GETINFO_CONFIG_TEXT))
AttributeError: 'Version' object has no attribute 'meets_requirements'
#8839 startpage.com filters search results by keyword now (due to Google change) reopened mikeperry defect major
Description

"The Tor Browser Bundle uses startpage.com as the default search engine, but startpage.com has a so-called "family filter" enabled by default, which filters out many webpages"

This is pretty funny for a browser that people use to evade censorship and filters.

#8842 TorBrowser: XML Parsing Error new mikeperry defect normal
Description

I received the following error while browsing a certain website:

XML Parsing Error: unexpected parser state

Location: jar:file:///TorBrowser/FirefoxPortable/App/Firefox/omni.ja!/chrome/toolkit/content/global/netError.xhtml

Line Number 308, Column 50:

        <div id="ed_netReset">&netReset.longDesc;</div>
-------------------------------------------------^

Unfortunately, I cannot provide the URL at which this error appeared.

#8852 Orbot + Firefox 10.0.4 + Proxymob 0.0.8 new n8fr8 defect major Tor: unspecified
Description

I installed Orbot and firefox 10.0.4 + proxymob 0.0.8 and I’ve been able to browse the deepweb for a few hours without any pb. But maybe 2 days ago I suddenly couldn’t access tor anymore. I didn’t make any changes in between. Orbot starts normally and is connected. If I go to https://check.torproject.org with firefox+proxymob I’ve got a nice “Congratulations. Your browser is configured to use tor”. But I can’t load any .onion page anymore. I tried to reinstall everything, I restored the factory settings of my phone, I tried to define proxies manually, I tried under Wifi and 3G, I tried older versions of firefox and even proxymob, etc, etc. But it just don’t work anymore even if I see “congratulations, your Browser is configured to use Tor” Any idea would be welcome !!

Samsung S GT-i9000 (I don’t want to root my device as I saw firefox running deepweb perfectly) Android GingerBread 2.3.6 unrooted firefox 10.0.4 proxymob 0.0.8 SOCKS Proxy Host 127.0.0.1 SOCKS Proxy Port 9050 SOCKS Remote DNS True

#8855 thandy needs a README or other easy to find documentation new nickm defect normal
Description

or better/easier to understand documentation. it seems to have people confused on what thandy is and isn't, and there isn't an easy place to point to for answers:

18:53         kwadronaut ) chiiph: where should i read about thandy, because besides isis mentioning it once I can't stop thinking about tandy, you know this 
                           small video screen stuff
18:53  kwadronaut ) it's hard to make meaningful statements if knowledge is lacking
18:53      chiiph ) https://gitweb.torproject.org/thandy.git
18:55 [ (isis) ) kwadronaut: chiiph: perhaps chiiph has followed it more closely, but from what i have understood it was in stasis for some time due to 
                 sebastian having some pretty bad misfortunes, though they have returned now and were at the tor-dev meeting a month ago and seemed determined 
                 to work on it again
18:55  kwadronaut ) chiiph: that's not what I meant. Need some sort of overview, how it works. Does it build software and clients contact it to pull updates?
18:56      chiiph ) isis: yes, I've been exchanging mails with sebastian about it, got to send him some fixes
18:56 [ (isis) ) https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Thandy
18:56      chiiph ) kwadronaut: all there is, is a specification doc in that repo, otherwise, I could talk as much as you want about it :)
18:57         chiiph ) kwadronaut: it doesn't build software, it's just a cryptographically secure wrapping to download tarballs, if you want to describe it 
                       in 3 words
18:57  kwadronaut ) consider this a bug report: get a readme in there about what it's supposed to do and how it makes that happen ;-)
#8864 Hidden service: Suddenly the service does not respond to new connections (INTRODUCE2 cell on intro circ with no corresponding rend_intro_point_t) new defect normal Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Description

I am hosting a hidden service with tor on "Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard 64-bit".

The clients can connect to my service without problems after I start tor (my service is available as it should be).

After some time (it depends - it can be 10 min, 30 min, up to 2 hours, but no longer than 2 hours) i get the following warning every few seconds:

[warn] rend_service_introduce(): Bug: Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro circ (for service "<censored onion address>") with no corresponding rend_intro_point_t.

(see attached tor logs)

If i get this warnings, the service is not reachable for new connections, so i have to restart tor (existing connections seem to be working).

Tor on the client side shows no error message (it seems that the service is reachable for the client, but the client does not get a response from the service, otherwise a message like "hidden service is unavailable (try again later)" would appear - which is NOT the case)

After the restart the service is available again, but after a maximum of 2 hours the same problem appears again (service is not available for new clients).

I have nothing special in my torrc file (only the default file with HiddenServiceDir and HiddenServicePort additionally defined).

#8865 test_event_handling is unreliable assigned robinson defect minor
Description

The test_event_handling test in 'test/integ/control/controller.py' relies on the timing of BW events to work. In theory tor should provide one of these events each second, but on our jenkins host this isn't always the case. In fact, sometimes tor goes over five seconds without emitting a BW event.

We need to fix the test to be more reliable. To do this we need to do an action with the controller guaranteed to generate an event then listen for that (instead of BW). CONF_CHANGED might be a good candidate.

I'm disabling the test until we can sort this out.

#8873 UnicodeDecodeError: 'ascii' codec can't decode byte 0xc2 in position 0: ordinal not in range(128) new atagar defect minor
Description

Starting arm (64816a180a29797dad6d11f8649db08632670d6a) results in a stacktrace -

arm :: (master) »  ./arm                                                                                                                                                                      ~/arm  1 ↵ 
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "./src/starter.py", line 458, in <module>
    _loadConfigurationDescriptions(pathPrefix)
  File "./src/starter.py", line 162, in _loadConfigurationDescriptions
    util.torConfig.loadOptionDescriptions()
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/util/torConfig.py", line 195, in loadOptionDescriptions
    line = uiTools.getPrintable(line)
  File "/home/gsathya/arm/src/util/uiTools.py", line 127, in getPrintable
    line = line.replace('\xc2', "'")
UnicodeDecodeError: 'ascii' codec can't decode byte 0xc2 in position 0: ordinal not in range(128)

Setting priority to major since I'm not even able to start arm.

#8874 0.2.4.12 TBBs lack a GeoIPFile in their torrc new erinn defect normal
Description

Data/Tor/torrc says

GeoIPv6File ./Data/Tor/geoip6

but it does not say

GeoIPFile ./Data/Tor/geoip6

that means there are no red dots on the vidalia network map, and vidalia doesn't know what country relays are in.

found by "jagget" on irc.

#8884 Brightcove (partial) breaks videos at Marvel.com new pde defect normal
Description

http://marvelkids.marvel.com/shows/189/marvels_hulk_and_the_agents_of_smash.

It may be specifically tied to any video content on http://marvelkids.marvel.com since it seems that videos work perfectly fine on the main marvel.com site but actually break on the subsite.

#8887 CERT PGP Based GPG KEY Missing In TorProject.org DNS new defect normal
Description

I could not find/obtain any CERT PGP DNS Record in torproject.org's DNS answer, which can be used to verify authenticity of files released, shared and signed by you.

torproject.org website (zone/domain), is already signed with DNSSEC, and, TLSA dns record also exist, which declares to public what exact SSL cert you(TorProject.org) use & have approved.

Now you need to add you GPG KEY which you use to sign your files and share with public, so that, users/public can authenticate files, by obtaining GPG KEY from DNS record, by using their own local Full DNSSEC supported DNS Resolver/Server/Client software.

GPG KEY obtained via DNSSEC AUTHENTCATED data can be trusted at higher level, than obtain it via PGP/GPG KEYSERVER(s), as all DNS data kept in DNS Resource Records (RR), which can be authenticated/verified very very accurately.

To query DNS records via Tor-proxy, such can be done:

Get & install "socat". Create a script file to create/start a "socat" based port-forwarding tunnel, so that a DNS query can be send on port 54 and then routing/forwarding it toward the Tor's Socks5 Proxy port 9150, by using a command like below:

  @start "socat 127.0.0.1:54 127.0.0.1:9150 8.8.8.8" /D"%ProgramFiles%\socat\" socat.exe TCP4-LISTEN:54,fork SOCKS4A:127.0.0.1:8.8.8.8:53,socksport=9150

above command line was copied from "socat-54-to-tor-9150.cmd" file from Windows computer. Binary files of "socat" tool were kept inside C:\Program Files\socat\ folder.

DNS queries can be done ANONYMOUSLY like this:

  dig @127.0.0.1 -c in -t any -p 54 torproject.org. +dnssec +additional +vc

If answer have "AD" (Authenticated Data) flag and "NOERROR" status, then answer is DNSSEC authenticated.

But still possible to modify by someone in the middle.

There are other public DNS-Server(s), which supports encrypted DNS queries, and also respect user's Privacy Rights. Correct SSL certificate(cert)/key has to be obtained first, and then can be used with "socat", for creating encrypted tunnels toward such DNS-Server via Tor-proxy, and then DNS queries can be done and very accurate answer/result can be obtained/received. See more info on "socat" doc/manual, and German & Swiss Privacy Foundation's Public DNS Server, etc.

At-least 1 DNS record like below must exist:

Since Erinn Clark (erinn@torproj...org) signs binary files, a CERT GPG dns record would look like:

  erinn._pka.torproject.org. TXT "v=pka1\;fpr=FINGERPRINT-HEX-NUMS-OF-SIGNING-GPG-KEY\;uri=https://www.torproject.org/erinn-clark-torproject.pubkey.txt"

or, it can also look like:

  erinn.torproject.org. CERT PGP 0 0 LONG-BASE64-ENTIRE-PGP/GPG-KEY-CODE

"CERT" is aka "TYPE37".

The actual "FINGERPRINT-HEX-NUMS-OF-SIGNING-GPG-KEY" code portion would look like:

8738A680B84B3031A630F2DB416F061063FEE659

The actual "LONG-BASE64-ENTIRE-PGP/GPG-KEY-CODE" code portion can be obtained by using below two commands by the TorProject.org zone/domain's actual owner/holder:

  gpg --export 63FEE659 > 63FEE659.pub.bin

make-dns-cert -n erinn.torproject.org. -k 63FEE659.pub.bin

I/end-user would prefer to obtain the entire (master-signing or 2nd-level-signing) KEY code from "CERT PGP" record, even if it is as large as 4KB.

It is More Important to deliver correct full/ENTIRE KEY code to USERS, than, sending it via a file/url, to make sure USERS are really getting authentic entire GPG/PGP-KEY code data, and then using it to authenticate files, with lesser chance of failing points, and with lesser complexity.

end-users can do such DNS queries to view GPG related DNS entry:

dig +short erinn._pka.torproject.org. TXT

or, like this:

dig +short erinn.torproject.org. CERT If ONLY file/URL based TXT option, is mentioned/used, THEN such sensitive FILE MUST NEED TO BE DELIVERED TO USERS OVER TLS/SSL/HTTPS ENCRYPTED secured and correct CONNECTION, between TorProject.org server and users computer, (verified by DANE).

And to be 100% SURE, that both side (TorProejct's-server & user's computer) are accurately using a CORRECT SSL/TLS cert OWNED BY TorProject.org itself, entire TLS/SSL certificate hash/checksum and its fingerprint ALSO need to be placed in DNS as well. See more info on TLSA, CERT dns-records, related documents. Again, it is more important to make sure USERS are really getting authentic files, with lesser chance of failing points, and with lesser complexity, and over correctly secured connection with correct server, so use BOTH PGP/GPG option mentioned above.

Adding both "TXT" based and "CERT PGP" based DNS entry, would be better, since your dns already has TLSA record.

TorProject has now already added their TLSA in DNS RR. :)

dnssec DANE protocol supported / built-into software like : "Extended DNSSEC Validator" firefox addon (www.os3sec.org) , "DNS-Trigger" (an "Unbound" based Full DNSSEC Supported DNS-Server/DNS-Resolver, www.nlnetlabs.nl), etc (along with "DNSSEC Validator" firefox addon www.dnssec-validator.cz) allows to obtain DNSSEC Authenticated accurate data, and then these can obtain or extract correct SSL/TLS cert hash/checksum & fingerprint from TLSA, etc DNSSEC-authenticated data, and then these can show warning message to user, if correct SSL/TLS cert is NOT used for encrypted HTTPS connection, or, if a fake/forged cert or fake server is used. Also use "Cipherfox", "Cert viwer Plus", etc firefox addons to view SSL cert details and chain, and configure those to show more info. You would also need to use either a VM based DNS-Serveer (you may use "VirtualBox", and "Tails"), or, another local computer based DNS-Server, (which are pre-configured to Transparently forward all traffic including DNS through Tor-proxy), and specify such DNS-Server inside the "Extended DNSSEC Validator" firefox addon. Also see "DNS2SOCKS".

To import entire pgp/GPG keycode from DNS , user can do one single command:

  gpg --no-default-keyring --keyring /tmp/gpg-$$ --encrypt --armor --auto-key-locate cert -r erinn@torproject.org

In windows, GPG software was obtained via "Cygwin", it can also be obtained from "gpg4win". And, to send GPG queries via Tor Socks5 proxy : First "Polipo" (a HTTP Proxy) tool was obtained and configured, to create a HTTP-Proxy-to-Socks5-proxy Tunnel (from HTTP Proxy port 8118 to Socks5 Proxy port 9150). See more info on "Polipo" in TorProject wiki area.

When these codes are added as command-line option, in a gpg command, then gpg query will go through Tor Socks5 proxy, (if polipo based forwarding/tunnel also exist):

  --keyserver-options no-auto-key-retrieve,no-try-dns-srv,http-proxy=http://127.0.0.1:8118 --keyserver hkps://zimmermann.mayfirst.org,hkp://pgp.surfnet.nl,hkp://2eghzlv2wwcq7u7y.onion,hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net,hkp://subkeys.pgp.net

Or, end users can also do such (preferred & recommended by me) : Base64 encoded CERT PGP dns record, can also be copied/used from a DNSSEC authenticated dns query result/answer, into a text file, and then it can be decoded, or, imported into gpg directly to get full GPG KEY. See gpg "import" command section to import from file.

So, PLEASE ADD "CERT PGP" DNS RECORD IN YOUR DNS.

Thank you, -- Bright Star (Bry8Star). bry 8 st ar a.t ya hoo d.o.t c om GPG_FPR=12B7 7F2C 92BF 25C8 38C6 4D9C 8836 DBA2 576C 10EC. GPG key-ID is last 8 digit of above code.

References:

#8889 Some Tor Project hidden server links pointing to public internet new defect normal
Description

On the hidden server page for Tor Project (http://idnxcnkne4qt76tg.onion), most links point to other hidden service pages for Tor Project, but some links under "Our Projects" do not, and the Tor Wiki link at the bottom of the page points to an URL not the onion site (http://vwp5zrdfwmw4avcq.onion/).

Can you put in hidden service links where they exist, and a warning that the link points to a web URL where a hidden service doesn't exist?

#8890 Observatory submissions don't use browser's SOCKS proxy settings new pde defect normal
Description

When I set a SOCKS proxy for my browser to browse over an SSH tunnel, I found that HTTPS Everywhere was still trying to make direct (non-proxied) connections to observatory6.eff.org to submit its certificate observations. This is potentially bad from a privacy point of view and might also cause the observations to be easier for a network adversary to block, because it's very clear where they're headed.

The Observatory submissions should probably respect the browser's proxy settings.

#8893 Vidalia stores wrong SocksPort in the torrc file needs_review chiiph defect major
Description

System: Windows 7 64 bit TBB: tor-browser-2.3.25-8_en-US Behavior: FF complains that the proxy server refuses connections "The proxy server is refusing connections"

How to reproduce:

Open Vidalia's settings> Advanced tab> Uncheck Randomly Generate> type a password (lets say 123) > Hit "OK"> Restart TBB

You will get an error message from FF as the following "The proxy server is refusing connections"

Now, check the torrc file and you will see that the SocksPort is set to 9050 when it should be 9150.

Even if you go back to vidalia's settings a check "Randomly Generate" the password the SocksPort is still to 9050.

#8896 Thread leak in integ tests new atagar defect normal
Description

On occasion when I run our integ tests they fail with...

Threads lingering after test run:
  <_MainThread(MainThread, started 139940160231168)>
  <Thread(Tor Listener, started daemon 139940072584960)>

I've seen this occasionally when running these tests on my netbook too, but it's very rare.

This indicates either that our BaseController's close() call is somehow failing to clean up our threads, or we're forgetting to call close() somewhere.

#8898 Tor says it closes socks listener, but doesn't actually close it. new chiiph defect normal
Description

With Tor 0.2.4.12-alpha on Windows 7 64 bit (probably not limited to this set-up) Tor says it would close a socks listener, but it does not. (Lucky me)

I added "SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9090" to my torrc which contained a similar line with port 9001.

Because the instance is a bridge, I didn't want to close and restart Tor. I went to the advanced settings of Vidalia and clicked on edit the current torrc. Then I marked only the newly added line and selected "Apply selected only".

Vidalia logged: [Notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9090 [Notice] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9001 [Notice] Closing old Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9001

but port 9001 is still used by Tor and the connection is not broken.

When I look in the torrc now the line "SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9001" is gone, the "SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9090" remains.

(The commented PublishServerDescriptor 0 is gone as well)

How to reproduce:

  • Launch Tor with SocksPort set to some port
  • Edit your torrc and add another SocksPort line
  • Open Vidalia and apply only the line you added
  • See what appears in the log and how it mismatches what actually happens
#8902 Rumors that hidden services have trouble scaling to 100 concurrent connections new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

tomaw from freenode/oftc tells us the freenode hidden service doesn't work well once there are 100 users on it.

This is a great example of something a high-coverage perhaps-chutney-based test network could test (and then regression-test).

#8904 Linux - App/Firefox/chrome/icons/default Missing new erinn defect normal TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

Someone forget to put in the App/Firefox/chrome/icons/default path and icons for the latest Linux version... :)

Cheers

#8912 TBB: Firefox not starting. new mikeperry defect normal TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

When trying to start and use the TOR Browser Bundle the Vidalia Control Panel will open and appear to connect properly but after a few seconds the program just closes and no browser appears. I have tried on multiple different versions of the TBB, updated all of my drivers, restarted my computer multiple times, and tried to install it to a USB drive and run it from there. Nothing works!

I run a 64-bit Windows 7 OS

Logs when Vidalia connects, before it closes

May 19 14:36:43.859 [Notice] Tor v0.2.3.25 (git-17c24b3118224d65) running on Windows 7. May 19 14:36:43.859 [Notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning May 19 14:36:43.859 [Notice] Read configuration file "L:\Tor Browser\Data\Tor\torrc". May 19 14:36:43.859 [Notice] Initialized libevent version 2.0.21-stable using method win32. Good. May 19 14:36:43.860 [Notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 May 19 14:36:43.860 [Notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151 May 19 14:36:44.075 [Notice] Parsing GEOIP file .\Data\Tor\geoip. May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] No AES engine found; using AES_* functions. May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] This OpenSSL has a good implementation of counter mode; using it. May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] OpenSSL OpenSSL 1.0.0k 5 Feb 2013 looks like version 0.9.8m or later; I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] Reloaded microdescriptor cache. Found 3527 descriptors. May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits. May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network. May 19 14:36:46.896 [Notice] New control connection opened. May 19 14:36:48.574 [Notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 0:00 hours, with 2 circuits open. I've sent 0 kB and received 0 kB. May 19 14:36:48.574 [Notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop. May 19 14:36:49.008 [Notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit. May 19 14:36:52.594 [Notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working. May 19 14:36:52.595 [Notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done.

#8915 Cannot spoof useragent and vendor new mikeperry defect critical TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

Can add any way to chage vendor to firefox via general.useragent.vendor?

Seems this only work in firefox 3 or older

Also firefox 17 not update the pref general.useragent.override without restarting the browser, this is actually same bug for newest vesions of firefox.

#8916 Windows Prefetch records the Tor Browser Bundle new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle (version 2.3.25-6, 64-bit) on Windows 7 showed that the Windows Prefetcher keeps records of the different Tor Browser Bundle applications:

  • C:\Windows\Prefetch\START TOR BROWSER.EXE-F5557FAC.pf
  • C:\Windows\Prefetch\TBB-FIREFOX.EXE-350502C5.pf
  • C:\Windows\Prefetch\TOR-BROWSER-2.3.25-6\_EN-US.EX-1354A499.pf
  • C:\Windows\Prefetch\TOR.EXE-D7159D93.pf
  • C:\Windows\Prefetch\VIDALIA.EXE-5167E0BC.pf

The following cache files are most likely similar to prefetch files and might contain traces of the Tor Browser Bundle:

  • C:\Users\runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\cversions.1.db
  • C:\Users\runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-C647E37CA0D9}.1.ver0x0000000000000006.db
  • C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\RecentFileCache.bcf
#8918 Windows paging file contains Tor Browser Bundle filename new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle (version 2.3.25-6, 64-bit) on Windows 7 showed that the Windows paging file, C:\pagefile.sys, contains the filename for the Tor Browser Bundle executable.

#8919 Windows Registry contains path to Tor Browser Bundle executable new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle (version 2.3.25-6, 64-bit) on Windows 7 showed that the registry contains the path to the Tor Browser Bundle executable.

HKEY_CURRENT_USER, abbreviated HKCU, stores settings that are specific to the currently logged-in user. Each user's settings are stored in files called NTUSER.DAT and UsrClass.dat. The path to the Tor Browser Bundle executable is listed in the following two files:

  • C:\Users\runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
  • C:\Users\runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat.LOG1

I did not find traces of the Tor Browser Bundle in any of the NTUSER.DAT files.

#8920 Windows Search indexes the Tor Browser Bundle new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle (version 2.3.25-6, 64-bit) on Windows 7 showed that it is likely that Windows Search indexes the Tor Browser Bundle.

Windows Search, which is enabled by default, builds a full-text index of files on the computer. One component of Windows Search is the Indexer, which crawls the file system on initial setup, and then listens for file system notifications to index changed files. Windows Search writes a number of files to the following location:

  • C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\

I have not found a way to read the Windows Search database files, but I would say it is likely that Windows Search picked up the Tor Browser Bundle at some point.

#8921 Windows Thumbnail Cache contains Onion Logo icon new erinn defect normal
Description

A forensic analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle (version 2.3.25-6, 64-bit) on Windows 7 showed that the Windows Thumbnail Cache contains the Onion Logo icon.

Windows stores thumbnails of graphics files, and certain document and movie files, in Thumbnail Cache files. The following files contain the Onion Logo icon associated with the Tor Browser Bundle:

  • C:\Users\Runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\thumbcache_32.db
  • C:\Users\Runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\thumbcache_96.db
  • C:\Users\Runa\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\thumbcache_256.db

Other Thumbnail Cache files, such as thumbcache_1024.db, thumbcache_sr.db, thumbcache_idx.db, and IconCache.db, may also contain the Onion Logo icon.

#8928 Anonymity has been abruptly unmasked new erinn defect critical
Description

Since downloading and using the latest version of TBB, I have watched Tor unmask itself without notification, or justification on at least two separate occasions. I was able to determine this because I initially and at random times hit the home page button which takes me back to your IP check page and it said I was not configured to use TOR and my IP address was revealed. I thought it was an isolated issue, nonetheless, I have been frequently checking the home page for IP verification since that time and it happened again a few days later. Each time it said that I was not using TOR in the middle of a Tor session, when it initially said CONGRATULATIONS YOUR BROWSER IS CONFIGURED TO USE TOR. Internet didnt get disconnected and Tor message log did not indicate any problems. At this point I may go back to the previous version of TOR just to be safe. It would appear this version is either bugged or some other issue exist. PLEASE FIX

#8934 ExitNodes 1 being ignored new erinn defect normal TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

Using Tor Browser Bundle 2.3.25-6 and 2.3.25-8 (Windows)

Have placed the following settings in the torrc file:

ExitNodes {SE} StrictNodes 1

Older versions of Tor would simply not connect (and give me error messages in the Vidalia message log) when it could not find a suitable exit node. However 2.3.25-6 has given me non-SE exit nodes frequently. I used it as an excuse to upgrade to 2.3.25-8 but am experiencing the exact same thing.

I had no problem with previous versions (sorry, already deleted older bundle so cannot verify the older version that used to work) where it would simply refuse to connect - at least I would know that a suitable exit node could not be found. But ignoring this setting seems dangerous. Any ideas?

Using Tor Browser Bundle 2.3.25-8 Vidalia 0.2.21 Tor 0.2.3.25 (git-17c24b3118224d65) Qt 4.8.1

#8935 endless redirects on brownpapertickets.com subdomain new pde defect normal
Description

Accessing https://vfpseattle.brownpapertickets.com sends the browser into an endless page reload/redirect loop. Disabling the add-on or the redirect rule for brownpapertickets.com solves the looping problem and the page redirects to the http version. I assume this is not unique to this particular subdomain but occurs with other subdomains; however, I have not tested this.

#8940 Move RecommendedTBBVersions from check.torproject.org to www.torproject.org assigned mikeperry defect normal
Description

Right now the only reliable way to programatically check for the latest version of TBB is by loading https://check.torproject.org/RecommendedTBBVersions. It would be very helpful if that file could also be hosted somewhere at https://www.torproject.org/. The main Tor Project website has a .onion address, and there are also several mirrors of it. This isn't true of check.torproject.org.

I'm working on Tor Browser Launcher, a program that helps you download, verify signatures, and keep up-to-date TBB: https://github.com/micahflee/torbrowser-launcher

I'm building the option to download updates over Tor, and I'm planning on making a second option to download updates from torproject.org's hidden service: https://github.com/micahflee/torbrowser-launcher/issues/41

The way it stands, the RecommendedTBBVersions request would have to not use the .onion.

I also just made it so you can choose your torproject.org mirror, so you can download the TBB files from a different website: https://github.com/micahflee/torbrowser-launcher/issues/32

If *.torproject.org is getting blocked, you should be able to choose a different mirror from the dropdown in TBL settings and download TBB, as long as the mirror you choose isn't also getting blocked. But there's no way for TBL to ask a mirror what the recommended TBB version is, so even with using mirrors there needs to be a request to check.torproject.org first, which would get blocked and prevent people from using TBB at all.

#8941 Small Torbutton icons should be 16x16 pixels new mikeperry defect normal
Description

Although tor-disabled-16.png, tor-enabled-16.png and tor-update-16.gif sound like 16x16 icons they are in fact 18x18 icons. That should not be the case as this might cause some weird behavior (see e.g. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8478#comment:13).

#8947 tor-browser-2.3.25-8_en-US.exe - Firefox is already running new mikeperry defect normal TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Description

Last night 22/05 I thought I would update TORbrowser - after a few issues of my own. I ran TorBrowser, it sets itself up and comes up with this error (screenshot attached) "Firefox is already running, but is not responding. To open a new window, you must first close the existing Firefox process, or restart your system."

I could not see a FF running. Anyway I thought I would leave it until the 23/05 when I switch on PC. I did not touch FF until after running the new Tor Browser that I downloaded. Same error message. So it is still doing it after a reboot. Screenshot of the Task Manager.

I extracted "tor-browser-2.3.25-8_en-US.exe" to "C:\Program Files (x86)" and created a shortcut on the desktop and running the desktop shortcut.

I had to revert to the version "tor-browser-2.3.25-6_en-US.exe" which is running on a data HDD i.e. not program files. this one is working OK.

I did check the download with the signature "tor-browser-2.3.25-8_en-US.exe.asc".

I am running W7(x64), FF21.0.

#8950 Comments on the formula calculating the number of Introduction Points new defect normal Tor: 0.2.???
Description

While looking at #3521 with hellais, we noticed that popular hidden services only have 3 introduction points, which is supposed to be the minimum number of introduction points a hidden service could have.

Maybe the formula at https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/ab3d5c049032651a9c9164262f9a8f81de9709d4:/src/or/rendservice.c#l1001 is not working very well, or Tor underestimates its own popularity, or all those services use an older version of tor.

As an example, here is the HS descriptor of DDG:

rendezvous-service-descriptor 4twtd2fpuz2xakzqpiuehdfp63ff2jp4
version 2
permanent-key
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGJAoGBAJ/SzzgrXPxTlFrKVhXh3buCWv2QfcNgncUpDpKouLn3AtPH5Ocys0jE
aZSKdvaiQ62md2gOwj4x61cFNdi05tdQjS+2thHKEm/KsB9BGLSLBNJYY356bupg
I5gQozM65ENelfxYlysBjJ52xSDBd8C4f/p9umdzaaaCmzXG/nhzAgMBAAE=
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
secret-id-part wpuxu5zpsgzgoqp7dq5yjay26vhachrx
publication-time 2013-05-23 19:13:59
protocol-versions 2,3
introduction-points
-----BEGIN MESSAGE-----
aW50cm9kdWN0aW9uLXBvaW50IHc1ZGFxeDZvajVvdTJvdzR6eW93ZnUybmVoY2Nl
cXVuCmlwLWFkZHJlc3MgODUuMTcuMjAuMjQxCm9uaW9uLXBvcnQgMjQ0Mwpvbmlv
bi1rZXkKLS0tLS1CRUdJTiBSU0EgUFVCTElDIEtFWS0tLS0tCk1JR0pBb0dCQUp3
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THRmODJnRFlHeGZHZTFsM0FmOG5uOXVKVS92QWdNQkFBRT0KLS0tLS1FTkQgUlNB
IFBVQkxJQyBLRVktLS0tLQpzZXJ2aWNlLWtleQotLS0tLUJFR0lOIFJTQSBQVUJM
SUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUlHSkFvR0JBTEFEdEx3d3JUb05MMnErd0VKemx5aGVjblox
OUg3V3AxZGpxUUpIWlVhVTlJZW5KMUxDV2c2OApkMkhUSG1OMVpINXFzeklpOEE5
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Njk4d0ZMLzRXWDMzbFQ2OXp1aVNKTS8zMCtaaDRBcTVqbkhKa2d2dU12ZmZzRlFQ
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IEtFWS0tLS0tCnNlcnZpY2Uta2V5Ci0tLS0tQkVHSU4gUlNBIFBVQkxJQyBLRVkt
LS0tLQpNSUdKQW9HQkFOck45NlNucG54ZW1hUlF4RG1CNkpCS1liNTlqZEhTWUhw
dTc2TTV2RytZS2dzOTYwakFGRjN3CjcrbEZJOWdlTkhtYkRZbGxQOTB4ZHZ5ekJY
aTcwaVNWSEZsWDBSRVNvaWlQWVBTUUVDMWdsbFFWdTAwK2dpNVgKVm0xWExJTmMy
ZVpUNkR3WGU3UGhnRjJHV2ZpZEdOS3VhMm14dUNETUJ2UUs1Qml3dHJsTkFnTUJB
QUU9Ci0tLS0tRU5EIFJTQSBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KaW50cm9kdWN0aW9uLXBv
aW50IGx4eHd0enQzdjR3cGUzand3d3djdmVzM3dsdmRvem10CmlwLWFkZHJlc3Mg
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RU5EIFJTQSBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KCg==
-----END MESSAGE-----
signature
-----BEGIN SIGNATURE-----
R8seD+2Xeb5zXOK3j3LDHDDskkGxRVjJ8u3EqoFEiLXfSdxjZ3tRJSlXj2WbWhHA
FAGrTZgzGcAr4ma9kRatchsbKEmIQW5cnsY8rk+gJwW+SHewFvV/iAGYLQ7pQ6dD
6+P0sPkLC47n1mvLFp81ie/WJqMGKDdZg1vS7FhATrI=
-----END SIGNATURE-----
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