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Ticket Resolution Summary Owner Reporter
#30176 fixed Clear memory in smartlist_remove_keeporder. paldium
Description

The smartlist functions take great care to reset unused pointers inside the smartlist memory to NULL.

The function smartlist_remove_keeporder does not clear memory in such way when elements have been removed. Therefore call memset after the for-loop that removes elements. If no element is removed, it is effectively a no-op.

#30175 wontfix Manually whitelist extensions removed from AMO for purely political reasons in Tor Browser to fight Mozilla's censorship tbb-team cypherpunks
Description

Mozilla recently removed the Dissenter Firefox add-on, an add-on that allows users to make comments on any web page that can be viewed only by other Dissenter users, from AMO for "hate speech" (which of course is a charge only even possibly related to some of the content its users freely posted on it and not any particular sentiment expressed by the program's interface, description, etc. itself). This is similar to the charges commonly levied against the Tor Project that it promotes child pornography, drug addiction, terrorism, hate speech, etc. simply because it facilitates the creation of a free and open platform that anyone can use anonymously, even those with ill intentions.

Surely, then, we must recognize the folly in accusing the creators of the Dissenter add-on themselves of hate speech (and thus removing their extension) simply for the expressions of its users and thus that Mozilla's removal of the add-on (in coordination with Google's removal of it from the Chrome Web Store, which should tell you all you need to know about the shadowy motivations behind it) was arbitrary, unjustified, and unethical. The same logic that's been used against Dissenter could easily be turned against the Tor Project by Mozilla in order to attempt to hinder the creation and dissemination of Tor Browser.

So my question is this: When is the Tor Project going to condemn this unjust censorship of an add-on that merely attempts to aid one of the goals of the Tor Project itself (the protection of freedom of expression online) from its partner Mozilla, and when is the Tor Browser going to provide its users with a convenient means to work around this odious totalitarianism from the browser (Firefox) it is based on?

Leaving the situation as it is, where any add-ons that Mozilla deems to be insufficiently politically correct enough are demoted to "temporary add-ons" that must be clunkily reinstalled with each browser restart, is unacceptable (as is requiring users to entirely disable the protections the current system from Mozilla provides because they want to install on a permanent basis an extension that was not removed from AMO for being a security risk).

Tor Browser should take a stand against this freedom of expression-hostile action from its partner Mozilla by adding to its forked Firefox code a "whitelist" of extensions that were removed from AMO purely for politically biased reasons, allowing them to be installed in Tor Browser normally as if they came from AMO itself. This strikes the right balance between preserving the general protections that Mozilla's extension security system provides while sending a clear message to Mozilla that the Tor Project, at the very least, will not allow Mozilla to censor its users or block any extension in its fork of their browser other than those that are actively hostile to the user (as opposed to hostile to Mozilla's agenda).

If the Tor Project is truly in favor of freedom online, then it can no longer stay silent about big tech censorship. After all, what is the meaning of the Tor network if its anonymity can only be used to shout in dark isolated corners where nobody can hear you? Dissenter, which has no restrictions on accounts registering with or using the Tor network to post, opened up the web universally for comment by Tor users, even the areas of it traditionally hostile to Tor. Mozilla's actions are a direct attack on this newfound freedom. The Tor Project opposed Cloudflare when it attempted to restrict the freedom of Tor users. Now it must express that same opposition to Mozilla.

#30171 fixed Always accepting third party cookies seems to break first party isolation tbb-team gk
Description

Not that many folks would do this intentionally but always enabling third-party cookies seems to break first-party isolation as the domain being used for isolating is just always "--unknown" See https://blog.torproject.org/comment/280689#comment-280689 for the report (many thanks Torlion). As that one is extra awesome I'll quote it here fully:

As I've experienced this issue several times again, I had another try to find out, what causes this problem. I've found a way to reproduce the issue and how to solve the problem. It's a bit difficult to explain, that's why I'll try by giving an example:

Go on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page)

Try the following changes concerning third-party cookies. On the left you see the setting, after the dashes you see the result of the exit node shown in the circuit. After changing the settings, you have to refresh the page or click on “New Circuit for this Site”:

Go on “options” - Privacy and Security” - “Accept third-party cookies and site data” and
set the following for third-party cookies:

“Never” – exit node is ok – wikipedia.org
“From visited” – exit node is ok – wikipedia.org
“Always” – exit node is not ok “--unknown--”
“From visited” – exit node is not ok “--unknown--”

If you change the settings from “Never” to “From visited”, the circuit shows the correct exit node. If you change the settings from “Always” back to “From visited” you will get the “--unknown--” issue.

Stay on Wikipedia (wikipedia.org) and try the following. After changing the settings, you have to refresh the page or click on “New Circuit for this Site”:

First Step:

Set the following for third-party cookies:

“Never” – exit node is ok – wikipedia.org

Now, choose “Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)”

Go back to wikipedia.org and refresh page or click on “New Circuit for this Site”

Result: exit node in circuit is ok – says “ wikipedia.org”

Second Step:

Go on “options” - Privacy and Security” - “Accept third-party cookies and site data”.

Set the following for third-party cookies:

“Always” – not ok – “--unknown--”

Now, choose “Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)”

Go back to wikipedia.org and refresh page or click on “New Circuit for this Site”

Result: exit node in circuit is not ok – says “--unknown--”

In both steps you have “Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)” and “Accept third-party cookies and site data Never” (greyed out). So it seems to be identical, however, setting “Always” for third-party cookies and then clicking on “ Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)” will cause the “--unknown--” issue, whereas setting “Never” for third-party cookies and then clicking on “Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)”will not cause the “--unknown--” issue”, and in the last case you will see the correct exit node in the circuit (which is “wikipedia.org_” in my example).

Go on options and set “Accept third-party cookies and site data Never”. Close Tor Browser and open again. Go on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page). Check circuit. Exit node is ok – says “wikipedia.org”

Go on options and set “Accept third-party cookies and site data Always”. Close Tor Browser and open again. Go on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page). Check circuit. Exit node is circuit is not ok – says “--unknown--”

Go on options and set “Accept third-party cookies and site data “Never” and then click on “Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)”. Close Tor Browser and open again. Go on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page). Check circuit. Exit node is ok – says “wikipedia.org”

Go on options and set “Accept third-party cookies and site data “Always” and then click on “Block cookies and site data (may cause websites to break)”. Close Tor Browser and open again. Go on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page). Check circuit. Exit node is not ok – says “--unknown--”

At this point the user gets stucked, because when having a look into the Options now, under “Privacy & Security” and “Cookies and Site Data”, you will see that cookies are blocked, but also the greyed out “Accept third-party cookies and site data “Never”. Now click again on “Accept third-party cookies and site data (recommended)“ and the greyed out “Never” changes into a black “Always”.

Solution:

Go on “Options” - “Privacy & Security” and “Cookies and Site Data”, change the black “Always” into “Never”. Go back to the page, where you have experienced the “--unknown--” issue (in my example “Wikipedia”), refresh the page or click on “New Circuit for this Site” and the “--unknown--” issue is gone. In my example you will see “wikipedia.org” again.

If you now wish to block cookies again, make sure you have set “Accept third-party cookies and site data “Never” and NOT “Always”. Even if you close and reopen Tor Browser you won't get the “--unknown--” issue any longer.

I really can't tell you why changing the settings for cookies influences the circuit. Maybe the developers of Tor Browser can find out what is all behind this or maybe one of you computer techies. I'm sorry for not having the technical knowledge to find out what is wrong. The only thing possible for me was to find out that quite obviously the settings for cookies changes something in the circuit. I hope I could help nevertheless.
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