Metrics report:

Average number of users connected to the Tor Network directly, via Bridges or Pluggable Transports (measured daily):

Number of civil society actors trained in circumvention or digital safety techniques:

Number of USG-supported online tools developed or improved to maintain an open Internet:

Number of connections gained during Internet censorship events:

USG-assisted campaigns and programs to enhance public understanding, NGO support and media coverage of digital threats and promotion of an open Internet:

Censorship cases:
- Gabon
- Turkey
- Zimbabwe
- Iran
- China

Top 10 countries by censorship event - first 6 months of 2016

Average number of users connected to the Tor Network directly, via Bridges or Pluggable Transports (measured daily):

Last quarter we reported that the decline in **daily users directly connected to the Tor Network** since the beginning of 2016 had stabilized. This quarter, we are starting to see some regain of growth. Only time will tell us if this means we are growing again or not:

Once again, it’s possible that these changes could be botnet zombies that died or couldn’t keep up with outdated Tor versions, as opposed to users being blocked or leaving the network.

**Users connected daily to Tor via Bridges**

Here is a graph of users connected to Tor via bridges. The decline you see in the graph below is due to our release of new bridge authority:

**Users connecting to Tor via Pluggable Transports**

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2 [https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-bridge-authority](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-bridge-authority)
Number of civil society actors trained in circumvention or digital safety techniques:

**Result:** 694 civil society actors trained in circumvention or digital safety techniques:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors trained</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event and/or partner organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Glasgow Women's Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>CILIP National Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>RLC Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Columbus Ohio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of USG-supported online tools developed or improved to maintain an open Internet:

- Basket2 - Pluggable Transport
- Core Tor - various testing improvements and bug fixes related to Pluggable Transports and Bridges
- New Bridge Authority
- Tor Browser - bug fixes related to Pluggable Transports

Number of connections gained during Internet censorship events:

The numbers below are an estimation based on the data we saw at our metrics.torproject.org website while censorship events were happening in their respective countries. Since we can’t really tell if they were individuals or organizations, we are calling them “connections.” You can read more about these events at the end of this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimation of total connections</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Censorship events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~120</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Internet censorship events during elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~400</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Internet censorship events during social media protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~1k</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Censorship actions done by the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~5k</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Censorship actions done by the government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USG-assisted campaigns and programs to enhance public understanding, NGO support and media coverage of digital threats and promotion of an open Internet:

- Rapid Response Campaign, a social media campaign targeting users from Turkey.
- Blog and Social media campaign explaining how to download Tor or connect to the network in cases where Tor is censored
- Multiple media articles listing Tor as a tool to use for privacy and against censorship (The Guardian, MotherBoard, The Intercept and others. See Press table in narrative report as well as section on media support).
Censorship cases:

Gabon

Gabon has been criticized for blocking Internet access during elections in the country in late August and early September.

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This African country is taking an unprecedented step in internet censorship

by Selena Larson  @selenalarson

September 16, 2016; 12:34 PM ET

Our graphics for directly connecting users from Gabon during September also shows these censorship events³:

The drop in the directly connected user count is counterbalanced by the increase of users accessing the Tor network using bridges\(^4\) and or pluggable transports\(^5\), as shown in the graphics below:

\[\text{Bridge users from Gabon}\]

\[\text{Bridge users by transport from Gabon}\]

**Turkey**

During 2016, the government of Turkey used online censorship as a way to oppress freedom of expression in that country. As our graphic shows below, we saw censorship events against the Tor network back in March and again this past quarter.

\(^4\)https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-07-01&end=2016-09-30&country=ga
\(^5\)https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2016-07-01&end=2016-09-30&country=ga
You can see these events being reflected in the usage of Pluggable Transports over the year by people in Turkey.

We saw similar spikes on our graph showing users connecting to Tor via Bridges:
Zimbabwe

In July, the people of Zimbabwe hosted many protests\(^6\) against their government to express their discontent. Most of these protests were coordinated online. As a result, the Zimbabwe government applied online censorship to suppress freedom of expression.

Our metrics show censorship events not only in July but also in August:

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Iran

We saw a big drop\textsuperscript{7} in the number of users directly connecting from Iran this quarter:

At the same time that was happening, we saw an increase in users using PTs\textsuperscript{8} and/or bridges\textsuperscript{9} to connect to Tor:

\textsuperscript{7}https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-07-01&end=2016-09-30&country=ir&events=on
\textsuperscript{8}https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-combined.html?start=2016-07-01&end=2016-09-30&country=ir
\textsuperscript{9}https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-country.html?start=2016-07-01&end=2016-09-30&country=ir
China

We also identified multiple censorship events over the quarter. China was the #2 country in our top 10 censorship rank for the quarter:

10 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2016-07-01&end=2016-09-30&country=cn&events=on
## Top 10 countries by censorship event - first 6 months of 2016

Our metrics site has a rank of countries by censorship events. We looked at the rank for the time period of the quarter (July 1st - September 30th):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Downturns</th>
<th>Upturns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christmas Island</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Antilles</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk Island</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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