Trac: Username: Rezonansowy Summary: Iintegrate TorButton and TorLauncher to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling them to Integrate TorButton and TorLauncher to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling them
Some users use the the "core" as a privacy-enhanced Firefox. I use the FF ESR Portable executable launcher to facilitate this.
I meant that core is the place where are located integrated addons, which you can't disable in, for example - pdf.js addon.
Allowing users to disable something which even has no description (e.g. TorLauncher) would allow them to completely turn off their privacy by browsing through Tor.
That's the ticket for Torbutton now. The one for Tor Launcher is #28044 (moved).
Trac: Cc: yawning, boklm to yawning, boklm, igt0 Keywords: needs-triage deleted, TorBrowserTeam201901 added Summary: Integrate TorButton and TorLauncher to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling them to Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling them
FTR, Tails' "Unsafe Browser" is basically Tor Browser, with Torbutton disabled and a scary homepage. It would be nice if there were still a hidden way for us to disable Torbutton for that browser profile. Otherwise, we'll have to ship binaries for another browser, which will make our ISO and upgrade delta significantly bigger. In order to plan Tails work on this topic, I need to know whether it'll still be possible to disable Torbutton somehow, and if not, I would be very grateful to learn what's the timeline is here, e.g. whether the plan is to ship this change in Tor Browser 8.5. Thanks in advance! Please let me know if you need additional info from me to answer my questions :)
FTR, Tails' "Unsafe Browser" is basically Tor Browser, with Torbutton disabled and a scary homepage. It would be nice if there were still a hidden way for us to disable Torbutton for that browser profile.
I see. I'll keep that in mind and I guess we could make a hidden pref available or something.
Otherwise, we'll have to ship binaries for another browser, which will make our ISO and upgrade delta significantly bigger. In order to plan Tails work on this topic, I need to know whether it'll still be possible to disable Torbutton somehow, and if not, I would be very grateful to learn what's the timeline is here, e.g. whether the plan is to ship this change in Tor Browser 8.5. Thanks in advance! Please let me know if you need additional info from me to answer my questions :)
We didn't plan to have the option of disabling Torbutton. But we can try to make that happen. I doubt we'll have this ready for 8.5. I mean we probably could but I think we should have some more time to test this, in particular as there are downstream projects that might be affected by this. But this should land in alphas definitely way before we start the esr68 transition. So, my current plan is to have this in Tor Browser 9.0a1, which should get out end of March/begin of April.
FTR, Tails' "Unsafe Browser" is basically Tor Browser, with Torbutton disabled and a scary homepage. It would be nice if there were still a hidden way for us to disable Torbutton for that browser profile.
I see. I'll keep that in mind and I guess we could make a hidden pref available or something.
Great :)
But this should land in alphas definitely way before we start the esr68 transition. So, my current plan is to have this in Tor Browser 9.0a1, which should get out end of March/begin of April.
FTR, Tails' "Unsafe Browser" is basically Tor Browser, with Torbutton disabled and a scary homepage. It would be nice if there were still a hidden way for us to disable Torbutton for that browser profile.
I see. I'll keep that in mind and I guess we could make a hidden pref available or something.
Great :)
FWIW: integration of the various Torbutton pieces directly into the browser (without having an extension-like thing to disable anymore) might complicate the pref plan but it should still be possible. One thing that would be good to know is whether all Torbutton features should be disabled or just, say, the Tor proxy related ones (I could easily see why the unsecure browser in Tails could have the external helper app warning dialog enabled (which is covered by an own pref anyway) or similar non-proxy features).