Opened 5 years ago

Closed 5 years ago

#12002 closed defect (fixed)

Initial M-Lab comments on threat model

Reported by: cypherpunks Owned by: hellais
Priority: Medium Milestone:
Component: Archived/Ooni Version:
Severity: Keywords:
Cc: Actual Points:
Parent ID: Points:
Reviewer: Sponsor:

Description (last modified by hellais)

This issue was automatically migrated from github issue

Here are initial comments on the threat model. These are minor, and many are clarifying questions that most probably reflect a misunderstanding on my end.

I'm happy to break these out into individual issues, if that would be more useful. For now, this seemed like an easy way to review in total, and eliminate those that don't deserve issue pride of place.

*Page: Roles*

An analyst may or may not publish the data, as I understand it. I’m not sure this impacts the taxonomy, but accessing and deducing meaning from the data is the core function of an analyst -- with publication being a very likely outcome.

Would an analyst also reply on access to the source code, and data descriptions, such that they can vet the methodology?

Bystander could also encompass whatever entity is implicated in the analysis of collected data. E.g. an ISP who’s throttling service, or a government who is censoring politically sensitive content. I think that this category of bystander (or, another title) is important in mapping the weight of different threats. E.g. if data is falsified and it implicates a powerful adversary, this could be more problematic in terms of an existential threat than false data that’s nonsense, or implicates an entity with little reason to care/little leverage. This, then, could be something that is included in the threat impact table -- any false data that’s published is, potentially, a threat to a bystander. Whether or not it makes sense to stretch things this far is another matter...

In M-Lab's case, bystanders also include the other tools on the platform, and a given entity that relies on these tools and data (e.g. the FCC, and a number of other governments rely on M-Lab in this way).

*Core Developer
Would this also be the role responsible for documenting the data format such that analysts can make responsible use of it? I view this as separate from documenting the Ooni design, although there may be a good reason to conflate the two.

Would the core developer also review and accept/reject net-tests into the core release of ooni-probe? I'm not seeing this process mapped anywhere. Although it's a future feature, I think it could have implications on threat modeling now.

*Net-test Developer
It seems like they’d also rely on the Core Developers to review and integrate their tests into the core ooni-probe release. This isn’t necessary in all cases, but assuming that's a common-ish goal...

I imagine they’d also share responsibility (or, take sole responsibility?) for documenting the data/data format (?)

*M-LabNS Operator
Would also rely on the Core Developer to integrate M-LabNS into the client build, such that it correctly queries M-LabNS prior to choosing an OONIB backend.

While the publisher does assume liability, this is not sole liability. The core developers, and the net test developers also assume liability, as does a rogue probe operator intent on injecting bad data (etc.) (whether or not they can be identified is another question). In this context, we’re laying out less a legally binding definition of “liability” and more a map that can identify nodes of liability, and ensure that any risk is documented.

The publisher also shouldn’t be the only role taxed with vetting the text decks and specifications. As above, since there are multiple nodes of liability, this should be part of the core developer role, and part of the net test developer role. (or, to put another way, the vetting is only as good as the documentation. (Caveat: I may be misunderstanding the definition of "vetting" here.)

Potentially also relies on access to source code (core developers documentation), and data (publisher), such that the assertions being made can be verified (similar to an Analyst)? This is an M-Lab meme, but one which makes sense beyond principle, in that the more contentions the claims made and the bigger the powers impugned, the more important it is that those witnessing them to confirm their veracity.

*Page: Use Cases*

*Initial release use cases: User Features
Although it's certainly our aim, I am hesitant to confine our assumption about a probe operator to someone well-trained. There is already buzz around Ooni and its potential, and while we don’t want to wait to create something shiny and perfect, it would be good to scope this use case with an understanding that there may be some less-trained, less-knowledgeable people also attempting to run Ooni. (This includes "less knowledgeable about their personal risk".)

Do we have an understanding of where the probe operator would access the ooni-probe to install it? This may also be a role? Or, is this covered in “invoking ooni-probe with an M-Lab-specific configuration”? The process here is a bit obscure to me.

*M-Lab deployment and management
@stephen-soltesz can add detail here as well.

Ooni is also responsible for data formatting, such that the data inputted can be processed into long-term storage by the M-Lab pipeline.

Placeholder, pending understanding of the collector policy implementation. It’s not clear to me how this is scoped, and the hope would be that a given collector can choose only to accept data that fits X specification (e.g. whitelisting the current Alexa top X00 URLs), and not rely simply on affirmation from the client that a given data input comes from a given test deck.

*Record quality and usefulness
In the case of M-Lab, the core developers are also responsible for ensuring, insofar as possible, that the policies and tests deployed derive only from active, client-initiated tests. (This was a part of the application process, so many moons ago.) Ensuring this ongoing will require some process element, but will be an important interaction between M-Lab (and any publisher) and the core developers.

*Future use cases
The “historical data” item will also imply metadata tagging on the part of a publisher (ideally).

*Page: Threats*

*Overall comment on a pretty impeccable taxonomy -- In the case of M-Lab operating in the role of OONIB operator, collector, publisher, any malicious attack that harms the operation of the infrastructure, or overall data collection, impacts bystanders, insofar as there are other tools running on the infrastructure, and other sources of data that must be collected for publication. I will leave this comment general to allow LA to fine-tune, or disregard. Happy to help elaborate if helpful.

Child Tickets

Change History (1)

comment:1 Changed 5 years ago by hellais

Description: modified (diff)
Resolution: fixed
Status: newclosed

I think this is no longer needed as we have moved quite beyond this phase.

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