cypherpunks: If you have a specific use case for fte that it doesn't support, please raise an issue on github: https://github.com/kpdyer/fteproxy. Thanks!
This got merged with the other version bump merge for FTE that gk did. However, I still do not think we should have any DNS names in the bridge lines. I also think that the user should be presented with a choice for IPv6 as a separate option for now, because users who do have IPv6 should have the ability to avoid hitting any IPv4 addresses. Ideally, we would ask the OS somehow if IPv6 worked, and do this sub-selection automatically for the user, but until we figure that out, they should be given the explicit choice IMO.
If we can't use DNS, we'll need to remove the IPv6 bridge for now. That was using DNS load balancing on AWS, and there's no guarantee that the IPv6 address will stay the same.
Can you remind me why we shouldn't use DNS names in the bridge lines?
If we can't use DNS, we'll need to remove the IPv6 bridge for now. That was using DNS load balancing on AWS, and there's no guarantee that the IPv6 address will stay the same.
Hrmm. If there is no way to get a fixed IPv6 IP, then we'll have to remove the lines. This is a shame, though, because IPv6 is pretty much completely uncensored everywhere, afaik.
Can you remind me why we shouldn't use DNS names in the bridge lines?
Because the DNS resolution happens outside of Tor before it has a circuit. This means that it is both a blocking point for the adversary (who might even be able to use their existing IPv4 DNS censorship infrastructure to block the resolution, depending on how DNS is configured on the client), as well as a clear signal that Tor is in use by that client, since it is cleartext.
If we can't use DNS, we'll need to remove the IPv6 bridge for now. That was using DNS load balancing on AWS, and there's no guarantee that the IPv6 address will stay the same.
Hrmm. If there is no way to get a fixed IPv6 IP, then we'll have to remove the lines. This is a shame, though, because IPv6 is pretty much completely uncensored everywhere, afaik.
I could find another provider that can host an IPv6 fte bridge. How much time do I have before the next tag+release?
Can you remind me why we shouldn't use DNS names in the bridge lines?
Because the DNS resolution happens outside of Tor before it has a circuit. This means that it is both a blocking point for the adversary (who might even be able to use their existing IPv4 DNS censorship infrastructure to block the resolution, depending on how DNS is configured on the client), as well as a clear signal that Tor is in use by that client, since it is cleartext.
It's not clear to me why this is worse, if we have DNS bridges in addition to hard-coded bridges.
Do you mind if I bring this discussion to tor-dev?
If we can't use DNS, we'll need to remove the IPv6 bridge for now. That was using DNS load balancing on AWS, and there's no guarantee that the IPv6 address will stay the same.
Hrmm. If there is no way to get a fixed IPv6 IP, then we'll have to remove the lines. This is a shame, though, because IPv6 is pretty much completely uncensored everywhere, afaik.
I could find another provider that can host an IPv6 fte bridge. How much time do I have before the next tag+release?
I will merge an IPv6 bridge as soon as you have it. Who knows when our next release will be, though. Anywhere between 1 day and 5 weeks from now.
Can you remind me why we shouldn't use DNS names in the bridge lines?
Because the DNS resolution happens outside of Tor before it has a circuit. This means that it is both a blocking point for the adversary (who might even be able to use their existing IPv4 DNS censorship infrastructure to block the resolution, depending on how DNS is configured on the client), as well as a clear signal that Tor is in use by that client, since it is cleartext.
It's not clear to me why this is worse, if we have DNS bridges in addition to hard-coded bridges.
From my POV, DNS doesn't add anything, and seems to introduce new risks and blocking points, especially for IPv6.
Do you mind if I bring this discussion to tor-dev?
Sure, go ahead. It might be useful to get a second opinion on this, especially if you believe that DNS improves our blocking resistance somehow (which I also do not see how it would).