Do you have an idea of how to enable the browser camouflage (#11183 (moved), #11393 (moved)) in a Debian package? At the moment it's fairly coupled to Tor Browser.
One possible hack (for a Chromium extension package) in the meantime is to distribute a private key alongside the build scripts, but I'm not sure if other Debian people would let me do that.
pkg-anonymity-tools mailing list is apparently a good place to discuss this. I am sorry, I am not great at relaying messages here and there. If you have any packaging questions, please consider signing up there.
#12716 (moved) should be fixed before we package this for Debian. The fix is fairly straightforward, turning it into a generic helper/wrapper script, mentioned in ticket:12716#comment:5
#12716 (moved) should be fixed before we package this for Debian. The fix is fairly straightforward, turning it into a generic helper/wrapper script, mentioned in ticket:12716#comment:5
#12716 (moved) is one way forward, but it's not the only way. I would say, don't wait for #12716 (moved) before packaging for Debian. All the proposed fixes on that ticket are pretty kludgy and I'm not prepared to merge any of them.
A reasonable solution (it seems to me) is to fork meek-client-torbrowser into a meek-client-debian-firefox or whatever, that knows all the Debian-specific paths. Then at least we'll have another data point to help settle what we actually need for #12716 (moved).
I wasn't going to wait; rather I was intending to submit a patch along the lines of ticket:12716#comment:5 - do you think that's kludgy as well? (Please comment on that ticket if you think so.) It would be preferable for Debian to maintain as few upstream-deviated files as possible. Under any usage scenario the helper program would be required, so it is not really a TBB- or Debian-specific thing.
Yes, I will leave the Chrome extension for now; upstream seem pretty uninterested in putting in effort to support it, and I don't have time to write a patch that big for Chrome.
This is blocking #17964 (closed) that will allow for the ooniprobe raspberry pi images to easily perform upgrades without having to ship a full Go build environment in the image. We really need to have the image as small as possible to ensure it's as accessible as possible.
This is blocking #17964 (closed) that will allow for the ooniprobe raspberry pi images to easily perform upgrades without having to ship a full Go build environment in the image. We really need to have the image as small as possible to ensure it's as accessible as possible.
But I don't want to upload them to Debian officially yet until #12716 (moved) is fixed. We know that fingerprinting is possible, so we ought to ensure that the browser-helper works on as many systems as possible. (I don't want a separate solution for Debian that isn't given any attention by upstream, because that's not a sustainable solution. It would be much better if Debian and meek+TorBrowser use the same underlying mechanism with a few variables changed.)
TL;DR: the latest situation is that I am waiting for (i.e. blocked on) a reply to my latest patch on that bug.
FYI, if AppArmor is enabled, the default Tor policy will block execution of the meek-client executable. A message like the following will be encountered upon running Tor via the service system:
"[warn] Could not launch managed proxy executable at '/usr/bin/meek-client' ('Operation not permitted')."
Running Tor as the root user bypasses the AppArmor policy and works fine, but you want it to work when called via automated service commands. The fix is to add the following line to the profile at /etc/apparmor.d/system_tor:
/usr/bin/meek-client ix,
This allows tor to callout to the meek-client without violating AppArmor by inheriting the execution policy ("ix"). Then you can restart both apparmor and tor and everything should work fine.
$ sudo service apparmor restart
$ sudo service tor restart
Note: Tested on Ubuntu 15.10, but adding here so that when officially packaged, both distros will work with AppArmor.