Implement update verification via Tor consensus in Tor Browser

This ticket tracks the Tor Browser implementation of section 3.1 of proposal 227.

added component::applications/tor browser owner::tbb-team parent::10393 priority::high resolution::wontfix severity::normal status::closed tbb-security tbb-update type::task labels

I think as a first step we should get section 3.1 less dense. There are some questions in particular that need to get sorted out before starting the implementation. See e.g. comment:15:ticket:10395 and comment:24:ticket:10395.

Here is said proposal 227. It will be a good thing to have, I guess.

Trac:
Cc: mcs, brade, mikeperry to mcs, brade, mikeperry, bastik.public@gmx-topmail.de

Trac:
Cc: mcs, brade, mikeperry, bastik.public@gmx-topmail.de to mcs, brade, mikeperry, bastik.public@gmx-topmail.de, proper

Set all open tickets without a severity to "Normal"

Trac:
Severity: N/A to Normal

Trac:
Sponsor: N/A to N/A
Reviewer: N/A to N/A
Keywords: N/A deleted, tbb-updater added

Trac:
Priority: Medium to High

Renaming keyword to make it a bit broader

Trac:
Keywords: tbb-updater deleted, tbb-update added

And now deprecated. #28465 (moved)

Trac:
Status: new to closed
Resolution: N/A to wontfix

closed

moved to tpo/applications/tor-browser#14676 (closed)