useful cover traffic
if an adversary is sniffing between client and entry guard and between exit relay and destination server he can do traffic correlation in both directions. one way of hiding returning traffic could be to let the middle relay send cover traffic to lets say 5 random entry guards as soon as it recieves returning traffic. the entry guards send that traffic to one of their clients. the adversary would not be able to know who of the 6 people recieved data from that server. while still being a large amount of overhead its not as much as maxing out all connections. for sending traffic thats not as exit relays would have to send something to random servers. instead the client upload bandwidth could be reduced and the client could send constant low bandwith cover stream.
this cover bandwidth could then be used for many useful things like:
-provide a decentralized private cloud storage -spread metadata and tor updates -allow download content or embedded media on onion sites to be hosted in an anonymous high lattency p2p network -website archive -mail service
Trac:
Username: elypter