We're adding a list of fallback directory mirrors to Tor in 0.2.8. Tor contacts fallback directory mirrors during bootstrap, and downloads the consensus and authority certificates from them. Once it has a verified consensus, it then uses the consensus to download relay descriptors.
Fallback directory mirrors allow Tor to bootstrap in networks that block the Tor directory authorities. This allows people to use Tor without manually configuring bridges or pluggable transports.
We want to identify around 100 stable non-exit relays, as exits currently experience high load. (We will include exits, but we don't want to overload them, so the default fallback weight of exits is reduced to 20% of their consensus weight.)
In October 2015, we created a list of candidate fallback directories. If your relay is on this list of candidates, and will be keeping its address and port for at least 2 years, we would appreciate permission to put it in the fallback directory list.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/15775/fallback_dirs.inc
(We will also include the details of relays that may become stable enough by the 0.2.8 release date.)
For the initial fallback directory release, we will only put your relay on this list if you give us permission. Please reply on the list, or to this email address.
I've updated the email (below), the wiki entry, and the fallback directory list (attached to #15775 (moved)).
(Do you think we should attach the list to the email as well as linking to it in the email?)
A list of fallback directories would help with the following tickets:
If the responses are on the list, I can add them to the whitelist (or opt-outs to the blacklist).
If you do get direct responses, can you send me a list of relays that need to be added to the whitelist / blacklist (after removing anything written by the operators).
Here is an updated draft email for tor-relays@tpo:
Dear Relay Operators,
We want to run a trial of fallback directory mirrors in Tor. Tor clients contact fallback directory mirrors during initial bootstrap, before they contact the directory authorities.
Fallback directory mirrors allow Tor to bootstrap in networks that block the Tor directory authorities. This allows people to use Tor without manually configuring bridges or pluggable transports.
We want to find around 100 stable non-exit relays, as exits currently experience high load. (We don't want to overload exits, so we automatically reduce the likelihood that exits are used as fallback directories.)
In December 2015, we created a list of candidate fallback directories. If your relay is on this list of candidates, and will be keeping its address and port for at least 2 years, we would like to put it in the fallback directory list. (We will also include the details of long-term relays that may become stable enough to be a fallback at some point in the future.)
For the initial fallback directory release, we will only put your relay on this list if you give us permission. Please reply on the list. (Your relay's details will be added to the publicly available tor source code.)
quick suggestion -- we should mention what fallbacks need to have, so that operators can evaluate whether they're likely to continue having them in the future. (Stable IP address, good bandwidth, decent fractional uptime... anything else?)
Here is a revision of the email that makes the criteria for fallback directories more explicit. I have also updated the wiki page with more detailed information. (I tried to make the email shorter as well, so more people would read it.)
Subject: Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors
Dear Relay Operators,
TL;DR: Stable non-exit relays can help tor clients use the Tor network. Please opt-in!
We want to run a trial of fallback directory mirrors (fallbacks) in Tor. Tor clients contact fallbacks to download the consensus during initial bootstrap, before they contact the directory authorities.
Fallbacks allow Tor to bootstrap in networks that block the Tor directory authorities. This allows people to use Tor without manually configuring bridges or pluggable transports.
If your relay is on this list, and will be on the same IP address(es) and port for at least 2 years, please consider opting-in for this trial. (Relays that aren't on the list are welcome to opt-in. They will be considered in future releases, or if the selection criteria change.)
For the initial fallback release, we will only add your relay if you give us permission. Please reply on the list. (Opt-ins, opt-outs, and chosen fallbacks will be managed using lists in the publicly available tor git repository.)
This is fine by me, except to replace "These relays need to be stable for the next 2 years" with "We want relays that expect to be stable for the next 2 years". If that's good with you, let's ask Roger to send it to the usual places. People take Roger seriously. :)
Ok, here it is with that edit, and minor clarifications to the last two sentences.
Roger, would you mind sending this out to tor-relays, and the usual places tor relay operators can be found?
Subject: Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors
Dear Relay Operators,
TL;DR: Stable non-exit relays can help tor clients use the Tor network. Please opt-in!
We want to run a trial of fallback directory mirrors (fallbacks) in Tor. Tor clients contact fallbacks to download the consensus during initial bootstrap, before they contact the directory authorities.
Fallbacks allow Tor to bootstrap in networks that block the Tor directory authorities. This allows people to use Tor without manually configuring bridges or pluggable transports.
If your relay is on this list, and you expect it to be on the same IP address(es) and port for at least 2 years, please consider opting-in for this trial. (Relays that aren't on the list are welcome to opt-in. They will be considered in future releases, or if the selection criteria change.)
For the initial fallback release, we will only add your relay if you give us permission. Please reply on the tor-relays mailing list, if you are able. (Opt-ins, opt-outs, and fallbacks chosen for inclusion in tor, will be managed using lists in the publicly available tor git repository.)