In addition to pdfjs there are 6 system add-ons shipped in Firefox 52 looking at the current beta branch. (on release there are 5 right now). We should investigate whether we need all of them and if not make sure that they don't interfere with Tor Browser.
Of particular interest are aushelper and e10srollout I guess.
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Kathy and I looked at the various system extensions that are present on Mozilla's current beta branch (52). Here is what we learned about each of them:
e10srollout
Enables e10s for a subset of users based on policies that account for which update channel the user is on, which add-ons are installed, etc.
See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1249845
See also toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/E10SAddonsRollout.jsm
flyweb
Only included in Aurora and Nightly builds.
Internet of Things related. See https://flyweb.github.io/
Based on our research, Kathy and I think the only system extension we should consider shipping with Tor Browser is pdfjs (we did not review recent changes to pdfjs).
For e10s, we will probably enable it for everyone or no one. For disabling of SHA-1 signatures, we already have the fix for #18042 (moved). The remaining system add-ons don't seem necessary.
For disabling of SHA-1 signatures, we already have the fix for #18042 (moved).
This add-on is about treating such connections as untrusted, your ticket doesn't disable SHA-1.
aushelper
This add-on is about CPU bugs. It can bite you in surprising cases (e.g. jemalloc)...
e10srollout
rollout means e10s is not ready...
pdfjs
What is the current update process for it?
What about FPI part of #7501 (moved) at Mozilla side?
It's not visible in about:support.
webcompat
What is the policy about it for ESR?
// 2 = allow SHA-1 only before 2016-01-01pref("security.pki.sha1_enforcement_level", 2);
( OnlyBefore2016 = 2 in CertVerifier.h) which has been transformed for esr52 into
// There used to be a policy that only allowed SHA1 for certificates issued // before 2016. This is no longer available. If a user has selected this // policy in about:config, it now maps to Forbidden. UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden = 2,
so it can be the proper fix for esr52, but not for esr45.
Based on our research, Kathy and I think the only system extension we should consider shipping with Tor Browser is pdfjs (we did not review recent changes to pdfjs).
For e10s, we will probably enable it for everyone or no one. For disabling of SHA-1 signatures, we already have the fix for #18042 (moved). The remaining system add-ons don't seem necessary.
I think I agree with all of that (I have some thoughts about the e10s situation which I'll put into #21432 (moved) shortly).
webcompat
Empty / stub extension to allow webcompat fixes to be deployed via the add-on update mechanism.
Of course, it's easier to disable this system add-ons update mechanism entirely, but it is inconsistent with other add-ons update policy.
Looks good to me. Applied to tor-browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2 (commit 6b8a66553b3aa4a518dc4448baf11099a8df22cd) and tor-browser-52.1.1est-7.0-1 (commit 475734012b70c7515a2a105ea6584136cee57bf6).
Trac: Status: needs_review to closed Resolution: N/Ato fixed