Opened 9 months ago

Last modified 8 months ago

#26294 new defect

attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

Reported by: arma Owned by:
Priority: Medium Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor Version:
Severity: Normal Keywords: tor-hs, tor-dos
Cc: asn Actual Points:
Parent ID: Points:
Reviewer: Sponsor:


Currently, an onion service's intro points each expire (intentionally rotate) after receiving rand(16384, 16384*2) intro requests.

Imagine an attacker who generates many introduction attempts. Since each intro attempt can take its own path to the target intro point, the bottleneck will be the introduction circuit itself. Let's say that intro circuit can sustain 500KBytes/s of traffic. That's 1000 intro requests per second coming in -- so after 24ish seconds (rand(16,32)), that intro point will expire: the onion service will pick a new one and start publishing new onion descriptors.

If the intro circuit can handle 1MByte/s, then rotation will happen after 12ish seconds.

With three intro circuits, each receiving intro requests at a different rate, we could end up changing our descriptor even more often than this. There are at least four impacts from this attack:

(1) Onion services spend energy and bandwidth generating new intro circuits, and publishing new descriptors to list them.

(2) Clients might get the last onion descriptor, not the next one, and so they'll attempt to introduce to a circuit that's no longer listening.

(3) The intro points themselves get a surprise 16k-32k incoming circuits, probably plus a lot more after that because the attacker wouldn't know when to stop. Not only that, but for v2 onion services these circuits use the slower TAP as the circuit handshake at the intro point.

(4) The HSDirs get a new descriptor every few seconds, which aside from the bandwidth and circuit load, tells them that the onion service is under attack like this.

Intro points that can handle several megabytes of traffic per second will keep up and push the intro requests back to the onion service, thus hastening the rotation. Intro points that *can't* handle that traffic will become congested and no fun to use for others during the period of the attack.

The reason we rotate after 16k-32k requests is because the intro point keeps a replay cache, to avoid ever responding to a given intro request more than once.

One direction would be to work on bumping up the size of the replay cache, or designing a different data structure like a bloom filter so we can scale the replay cache better. I think we could succeed there. The benefits would be to (1) and (2) and (4) above, i.e. onion services won't spend so much time making new descriptors, and clients will be more likely to use an onion descriptor that's still accurate. The drawback would be to (3), where the hotspots last longer, that is, the poor intro point feels the damage for a longer period of time.

Taking a step back, I think there are two directions we can go here. Option one, we can try to scale to handle the load. We would focus on load balancing better, like reacting to an attack by choosing super fast intro points, and either choosing fast middle nodes too, or some fancier approach like having multiple circuits to your intro point. Option two, we recognize that this volume of introduction requests represents a problem in itself, and try to introduce defenses at the intro point level. Here we focus on proof of work schemes or other ways to slow down the flow, or we improve the protocol to pass along hints about how to sort the intro requests by priority.

Child Tickets

Change History (2)

comment:1 Changed 9 months ago by asn

Cc: asn added

Agreed this is an interesting and useful problem to work on.

comment:2 Changed 8 months ago by dgoulet

Keywords: tor-hs tor-dos added
Milestone: Tor: unspecified
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