I actually think we are good for our own extensions. System extensions are good by default it seems and extensions already running/being shipped with are getting whitelisted during migration (see the resulting extensions.webextensions.ExtensionStorageIDB.migrated.https-everywhere-eff@eff.org etc.). Thus I think this is cool for getting extension updates as well. That is: updates whitelisted won't break if never versions are up for download.
There is the rest risk of Mozilla messing this up vs. better protection against random extensions in Tor's default mode. Right now, I am leaning towards following Mozilla's defaults, though, just doing #31555 (moved). Thoughts?
Trac: Cc: N/Ato tbb-team Status: needs_review to needs_information
What I had thought was: by default in Tor Browser we only have private windows, so it makes sense to always enable extensions. Otherwise from the user perspective it will be broken behaviour: they might install an extension and see no change (icons, etc.), then maybe file bugs.
It may work as a protection against something that we don't support: installing extensions others than the shipped ones. But, at the end of the day, we do not forbid installing extensions either, so this change might be surprising for users.
What I had thought was: by default in Tor Browser we only have private windows, so it makes sense to always enable extensions. Otherwise from the user perspective it will be broken behaviour: they might install an extension and see no change (icons, etc.), then maybe file bugs.
It may work as a protection against something that we don't support: installing extensions others than the shipped ones. But, at the end of the day, we do not forbid installing extensions either, so this change might be surprising for users.
Okay, that's not unreasonable. After all the users might not know (and should not need to know) that they are in a special mode. They just want to have a working browser and installing extensions is surely working without issues in a vanilla Firefox, right? Let's take your patch then. We can revisit that decision later on if needed. Cherry-picked onto tor-browser-68.1.0esr-9.0-1 (commit 8aabfb8128a8125a00d0a36d41518379258e0b38).
Trac: Status: needs_information to closed Resolution: N/Ato fixed