Tor Relay Guide
It seems not to be not possible, to find and change some of configurations lines:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide/DebianUbuntu
#change the nickname "myNiceRelay" to a name that you like Nickname myNiceRelay ORPort 443 ExitRelay 0 SocksPort 0 ControlSocket 0
Change the email address bellow and be aware that it will be published
ContactInfo tor-operator@your-emailaddress-domain
I changed my file like this:
Configuration file for a typical Tor user
Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
(may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
by removing the "#" symbol.
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
See 'man tor', orfor more options you can use in this file.
Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SocksPort 0 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. #SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
you make.
#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16 #SocksPolicy reject *
Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
you want.
We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
--runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 0
If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C #CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
to tell people.
HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/ #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
################ This section is just for relays #####################
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
SeeRequired: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 443
If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen #ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
outgoing traffic to use.
OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
#Nickname holyghostwork
Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
be at least 20 KB.
Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) #RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
hibernating.
Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 4 GB
Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
#ContactInfo Random Person
You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person
Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen #DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
#MyFamily keyid,
keyid,...
A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
to last, and the first match wins. If you want to replace
the default exit policy, end this with either a reject : or an
accept :. Otherwise, you're augmenting (prepending to) the
default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
described in the man page or at
https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
Look atfor issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
users will be told that those destinations are down.
For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject : # allow irc ports but no more #ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy #ExitPolicy reject : # no exits allowed
Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
#BridgeRelay 1
By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
mechanisms likea private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#PublishServerDescriptor 0
Trac:
Username: siggi