Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
The official advice from the Tor Project is not alter any settings in the Tor Browser, like installing browser extensions, because this will make the individual browser less unique and more vulnerable to fingerprinting. But, as long as javascript is enabled, the individual Tor Browser seems to have a more or less unique fingerprint. Most people are probably aware of the panopticlick and amiunique fingerprinting tests, but there are also these two sites: (brax.me/geo/) and (tor.triop.se/) which assigns a unique identifying number to a user's tor browser that remains more or less constant, until javascript is disabled.
My question-proposal is this. Since the Tor Browser (with javascript enabled) is not wholly resistant to fingerprinting, why not install a user-agent switcher or some other browser extension that can spoof details about the browser? Sure it will make the individual Tor Browser behave differently but is that such a bad thing when it can already be identified and potentially tracked across website visits?
I have tested one user-agent switcher (gitlab.com/ntninja/user-agent-switcher) and it provides only partial protection - despite setting it to random mode, changing every minute, the same fingerprint codes appear from time to time Can anyone suggest a better user-agent switcher than this one?
I don't know if this sub-topic has been addressed elsewhere in the forums, so you are welcome to link it to a pre-existing ticket.
Trac:
Username: thelamper