Implement Adaptive Padding or some variant and measure overhead vs accuracy
As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.
My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf (Slides: http://www.cse.psu.edu/~tjaeger/cse543-f06/presents/Kiran_baserate.pdf)
Activity
changed milestone to %Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
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Cc: N/A to g.koppen@jondos.de
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Description: As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://ksubrick.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.8982
to
As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.
My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://ksubrick.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.8982
(Direct link, since citeseer is often down: http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf)
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Trac:
Description: As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://ksubrick.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.8982
(Direct link, since citeseer is often down: http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf)
to
As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.
My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://ksubrick.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.8982 (Direct link, since citeseer is often down: http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf)
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Trac:
Description: As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://ksubrick.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.1.8982 (Direct link, since citeseer is often down: http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf)
to
As a defense against Website Traffic Fingerprinting, we should implement a tunable cover traffic defense that we could set from the consensus with a value dependent upon available Guard bandwidth relative to Exit capacity.
My favorite from the research literature is http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ShWa-Timing06.pdf, because it appears to be tunable in this fashion.
The "BUFLO" variant proposed by this paper is better specified, but it's not clear it actually performs better for a given overhead quantity: http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~xcai/fp.pdf
This is likely a research task. People who attempt it should also read http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/Axelsson.pdf (Slides: http://www.cse.psu.edu/~tjaeger/cse543-f06/presents/Kiran_baserate.pdf)
Trac:
Username: nikita
Cc: g.koppen@jondos.de to g.koppen@jondos.de, nikita@illinois.edu-
This now has a proposal: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/254-padding-negotiation.txt
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Keywords: SponsorZ research-needed tor-relay deleted, SponsorZ research-needed tor-relay 028-triage added Trac:
Cc: g.koppen@jondos.de, nikita@illinois.edu to g.koppen@jondos.de, nikita@illinois.edu, whonix-devel@whonix.org
Severity: N/A to Normal
Adaptive Padding per se, maybe not. But there have been big advances in network padding that we should maybe look at. I know Mike has been active in this field.
Trac:
Cc: g.koppen@jondos.de, nikita@illinois.edu, whonix-devel@whonix.org, teor to g.koppen@jondos.de, nikita@illinois.edu, whonix-devel@whonix.org, teor, mikeperrymentioned in issue #8453 (moved)
mentioned in issue #17198 (moved)
mentioned in issue #17199 (moved)
mentioned in issue #26632 (moved)
mentioned in issue #26633 (moved)
moved to tpo/core/tor#7028 (closed)
mentioned in issue tpo/core/tor#8453 (moved)
mentioned in issue tpo/core/tor#17198 (closed)
mentioned in issue tpo/core/tor#17199 (closed)
mentioned in issue tpo/core/tor#26632 (closed)
mentioned in issue tpo/core/tor#26633 (closed)
mentioned in issue tpo/core/torspec#100
