tor_tls_context_new(): Disabling SSLv3 because this OpenSSL version might otherwise be vulnerable to CVE-2011-4576 (compile-time version 10000003 (OpenSSL 1.0.0j-fips 10 May 2012); runtime version 10000003 (OpenSSL 1.0.0j-fips 10 May 2012))
Trac: Username: kukabu
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I think that might be because your OS has set up its opensssl to report an incorrect value for OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER: look how it's talking about 1 00 00 00 3 , but that doesn't correspond to 1.0.0j.
Okay, this is a problem that we have with Fedora perpetually. Within each Fedora release, they freeze the OpenSSL version number reported by SSLeay() and by OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, even when they upgrade to a newer OpenSSL. So even though you have "1.0.0j" according to the human-readable version string, it's calling itself an alpha or beta version of OpenSSL 1.0.0, and Tor can'd tell that it's really been upgraded.
I'm not sure what the right behavior is here, but I think our best bet might be to just treat this as Fedora being Fedora, and accept that we will sometimes mistake a Fedora openssl for an older one than it really is. Other approaches -- like testing for the presence of the bug at runtime, or trying to parse the human-readable version string -- seem like they would be error-prone too, just in different ways.
I'm similarly not a big fan of chasing around fedora trying to figure out how they want you to learn what their openssl "really" is.
If their headers say openssl is one version, and something else says it's something else, that sounds like a pretty clear bug to me. But I know they don't consider it a bug. Is there some mechanism that they expose and promise will be accurate, to figure out what capabilities they added/changed? Or do they just not care about this situation either?
our best bet might be to just treat this as Fedora being Fedora, and accept that we will sometimes mistake a Fedora openssl for an older one than it really is. Other approaches -- like testing for the presence of the bug at runtime, or trying to parse the human-readable version string -- seem like they would be error-prone too, just in different ways.
How about letting config options choose Tor's behavior, and then the Tor rpm can, if it knows what openssl it will secretly be using, turn on behaviors that it wants?
I haven't yet heard about an openssl feature that we're missing so badly that we should spend time on this issue though.
RPM maintainers don't rebuild Tor packages when OpenSSL gets upgraded. I suppose that we could add an artificial dependency on a too-new version of OpenSSL, but that's a little goofy.
Trac: Username: kukabu Status: new to closed Summary: tor disables the SSLv3 for OpenSSL 1.0.0j to tor disables the SSLv3 for OpenSSL 1.0.0j on Fedora Resolution: N/Ato not a bug