Changes between Version 19 and Version 20 of TorWeeklyNews/BugsToPlug


Ignore:
Timestamp:
May 28, 2014, 1:45:59 PM (4 years ago)
Author:
karsten
Comment:

Re-wrap paragraphs to 70 chars.

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  • TorWeeklyNews/BugsToPlug

    v19 v20  
    4040
    4141{{{
    42 The bridge distributor BridgeDB [XXX] usually gives out bridges by responding to user requests via HTTPS and email. A while ago, BridgeDB also gave out bridges to a very small number of people who would then redistribute bridges using their social network. We would like to resume sending bridges to these people, but only if BridgeDB can be made to send them via GnuPG-encrypted emails [XXX]. If you'd like to dive into the BridgeDB code and add support for GnuPG-encrypted emails, please take a look at the ticket and give it a try.
     42The bridge distributor BridgeDB [XXX] usually gives out bridges by
     43responding to user requests via HTTPS and email. A while ago, BridgeDB
     44also gave out bridges to a very small number of people who would then
     45redistribute bridges using their social network. We would like to
     46resume sending bridges to these people, but only if BridgeDB can be
     47made to send them via GnuPG-encrypted emails [XXX]. If you'd like to
     48dive into the BridgeDB code and add support for GnuPG-encrypted
     49emails, please take a look at the ticket and give it a try.
    4350
    4451[XXX]: https://bridges.torproject.org/
     
    4754
    4855{{{
    49 The bridge distributor BridgeDB [XXX] rate-limits incoming emails by their email address. However, BridgeDB frequently sees hordes of evilbots trying to steal all bridges by using "different" email addresses such as feidanchaoren00001@, feidanchaoren00002@, ..., feidanchaoren00034@. BridgeDB should start "fuzzy" matching email addresses [XXX] so that it can detect related addresses and then block them as a group. A volunteer in #tor-dev (sorry! we´ve forgotten your name!) suggested using Levenshtein´s distance algorithm [XXX]. If this sounds algorithmically challenging to you, and you'd like to try implementing this in BridgeDB's Python/Twisted codebase, please take a look at the ticket for details.
     56The bridge distributor BridgeDB [XXX] rate-limits incoming emails by
     57their email address. However, BridgeDB frequently sees hordes of
     58evilbots trying to steal all bridges by using "different" email
     59addresses such as feidanchaoren00001@, feidanchaoren00002@, ...,
     60feidanchaoren00034@. BridgeDB should start "fuzzy" matching email
     61addresses [XXX] so that it can detect related addresses and then block
     62them as a group. A volunteer in #tor-dev (sorry! we´ve forgotten your
     63name!) suggested using Levenshtein´s distance algorithm [XXX]. If this
     64sounds algorithmically challenging to you, and you'd like to try
     65implementing this in BridgeDB's Python/Twisted codebase, please take a
     66look at the ticket for details.
    5067
    5168[XXX]: https://bridges.torproject.org/