wiki:org/meetings/2017Amsterdam/Notes/AntiCensorship
  • Future of Anti-Censorship Session :LOGBOOK: CLOCK: [2017-03-24 Fri 14:03]--[2017-03-24 Fri 15:24] => 1:21 :END:

[2017-03-24 Fri 14:03]

Anti-censorship technology in Tor:

  • pluggable transports: obfs*, meek, etc.
  • tor is not doing super well as an anti-censorship tool

obfs4 may be blockable? there's some trac ticket

future PT: snowflake, using webRTC

goal: we should be able to easily see at any point in time, which places tor works and which places it doesn't

secret entry into the Tor network as the default / common case instead of a special case?

Broader development / deployment of domain fronting techniques?

Can we make other protocols look like Tor? For instance, could services with large user bases have their users use PTs to connect to their services?

... discussion ...

Results:

Community

* Awareness

  • Blog posts about censorship incidents
  • Tor partners with media orgs to talk about censorship incidents
  • Simulate censorship environments to raise awareness
  • Educate users about the dangers of 1-hop circumvention tools

* Partnership

  • work with other orgs (e.g. privacy international) to discover censorship
  • funding and resources for big companies
  • distribute tor using big websites

Policy

  • every website is a tor bridge
  • tor pressures govs and companies to disable censorship

Measurement

  • complete visibility of which places block tor and which PTs
  • broader network metrics
  • other browsers should autodetect censorship and enable tor
  • ooni censorship circumvention suggestions
  • ooni in major browser

Research

  • automated discovery of blocking techniques
  • realistic adversary models
  • more connections to anti censorship research
  • secret entry into tor as the common case
  • removing distinguishers from other protocols
  • tor over mesh networks
  • deniability of tor usage

Usability / UX

  • Users should never have to configure bridges or know what they are
  • automated PT selection
  • no performance impairments from obfuscation

Technology / Tools

  • Mobile apps using PTs directly to generate cover traffic
  • blocking Tor means blocknig the internet
  • ephemeral bridges within applications (e.g., HTTPS everywhere)
  • collaborate with other circumvention tools on PTs
  • automated bridge distribution that scales
  • possible to get the tor binary from anywhere
  • use bluetooth / nfc to transfer anti-censorship configs
Last modified 5 months ago Last modified on Apr 12, 2017, 11:19:31 PM