Changes between Initial Version and Version 1 of org/meetings/2017Amsterdam/Notes/AntiCensorship


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Timestamp:
Apr 12, 2017, 11:16:56 PM (2 years ago)
Author:
alison
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add notes

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  • org/meetings/2017Amsterdam/Notes/AntiCensorship

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     1
     2* Future of Anti-Censorship Session
     3  :LOGBOOK: 
     4  CLOCK: [2017-03-24 Fri 14:03]--[2017-03-24 Fri 15:24] =>  1:21
     5  :END:     
     6[2017-03-24 Fri 14:03]
     7
     8Anti-censorship technology in Tor:
     9
     10* pluggable transports: obfs*, meek, etc.
     11* tor is not doing super well as an anti-censorship tool
     12
     13* obfs4 may be blockable? there's some trac ticket
     14
     15* future PT: snowflake, using webRTC
     16
     17* goal: we should be able to easily see at any point in time, which places tor works and which places it doesn't
     18
     19* secret entry into the Tor network as the default / common case instead of a special case?
     20
     21* Broader development / deployment of domain fronting techniques?
     22
     23Can we make other protocols look like Tor?  For instance, could services with large user bases have their users use PTs to connect to their services?
     24
     25... discussion ...
     26
     27Results:
     28
     29** Community
     30
     31*** Awareness
     32
     33- Blog posts about censorship incidents
     34- Tor partners with media orgs to talk about censorship incidents
     35- Simulate censorship environments to raise awareness
     36- Educate users about the dangers of 1-hop circumvention tools
     37
     38*** Partnership
     39- work with other orgs (e.g. privacy international) to discover censorship
     40- funding and resources for big companies
     41- distribute tor using big websites
     42 
     43** Policy
     44 - every website is a tor bridge
     45 - tor pressures govs and companies to disable censorship
     46
     47** Measurement
     48 - complete visibility of which places block tor and which PTs
     49 - broader network metrics
     50 - other browsers should autodetect censorship and enable tor
     51 - ooni censorship circumvention suggestions
     52 - ooni in major browser
     53
     54** Research
     55 - automated discovery of blocking techniques
     56 - realistic adversary models
     57 - more connections to anti censorship research
     58 - secret entry into tor as the common case
     59 - removing distinguishers from other protocols
     60 - tor over mesh networks
     61 - deniability of tor usage
     62 
     63** Usability / UX
     64 - Users should never have to configure bridges or know what they are
     65 - automated PT selection
     66 - no performance impairments from obfuscation
     67
     68** Technology / Tools
     69 - Mobile apps using PTs directly to generate cover traffic
     70 - blocking Tor means blocknig the internet
     71 - ephemeral bridges within applications (e.g., HTTPS everywhere)
     72 - collaborate with other circumvention tools on PTs
     73 - automated bridge distribution that scales
     74 - possible to get the tor binary from anywhere
     75 - use bluetooth / nfc to transfer anti-censorship configs