• There are places where Tor is blocked, we need to strengthen the story
  • Need to make the network and techniques more resilient, and *also* improve the user experience
  • What should the scope of our anti-censorship team be?
  • PTs, BridgeDB/Bridges, Tor Browser UX, Rapid Response, Education / Advocacy, Relationships


  • Tor Metrics and OONI identify use/blockages and generates report
  • Tor does work in many places with/without bridges!
  • Debugging / investigation does happen via individuals on Tor IRC, other channels
  • We have many things in Tor that deals with censorship circumvention user story
  • We have partners, researchers, communities that are working on this
  • Funding coming/available to focus on anti-censorship of Tor


  • We don't make censorship measurement actionable; we have piecemeal solutions, but not integrated
  • Don't have anyone on the team today to consume alerts/data/input
  • No public point of contact, collab around Tor censorship
  • Many censorship circumvention techniques are unmaintained, or not resourced enough
  • Pluggable Transports not actively maintained by anyone
  • Tor Browser UX is needed for users (ala bridge request / mote work)
  • Need to balance anonymity vs anti-censorship use cases and needs
  • PT development is mostly done outside of Tor, no ownership of productization side
  • People aren't aware of the Support portal, how can we work with partners with help desks to upstream support


  • Create a known point of contact to report Tor censorship
  • Identity all countries where Tor is blocked, then research methodoligies, techniques, so we can respond
  • Rapid Response and Education Materials
  • Network Team is looking into this, but need to find way for good handoff to incoming anti-Censorship team/developer
  • Anti-Censorship Team should be connected/with the Network Team as onboarding/transition
  • Team should be broad and include community partners from PT community, Adversary lab, Guardian Project, etc other working on anti-censorship project
  • Adversary Lab tool can be used to analyze blocking, generate new forms of PT's
  • Need more PT / bridges, in more places
  • Create new easy packages for volunteer bridge operators
  • Anti-Censorship developer maybe should also be coordinator/manager of virtual/community team


  • Mainstream ISPs in Mexico block Tor DirAuth, so they cannot run relays; home's can't run relays
  • ISPs blocking legitimate use of the network, because it looks like reselling the network connection
  • Anti-censorship event will likely happen within months, and we'll feel pressure from urgent situation
  • This needs to be prioritized and not subsumed by other things


  • Do we have something in place if Tor is blocked in a place?

-- We don't have a systematic, automated (realtime?) way -- Tor metrics graphs can show something odd (drop in connections, traffic) -- Some cases are annotated in trac list, or send out via mailing list -- OONI has tests for this, testing vanilla Tor, and bridges shipped in Tor Browser are blocked

  • What are challenges in automating alerts when there are spikes in Tor Metrics?

-- There were some experimental stuff in anomaly detection, by several groups -- Nobody on the receiving side of the data; need humans to check for false positives -- Can we look at change in daily average users? No one watching those charts

  • What does "Rapid Response" mean?

-- 1) figure out is it happening? -- 2) how/what is happening? -- 3) publish ways to work around through public communication -- .... 6) prevent this blocking from the future

Last modified 2 years ago Last modified on Oct 1, 2018, 10:59:53 PM