Who uses Tor?
Quién usa Tor?
Creating Tor’s first personas

UX Team - Tor Dev Meeting Stockholm 2019
Intro

Human Centred Design and Tor
What we’ll cover:

- What are personas?
- Why do we need them?
- How did we make them?
- Persona showcase & workshop
- Room for improvement
- How to collaborate
What are personas?
Empirical and nonempirical
Personas give us a person to connect with, someone who has goals for using the product, ensuring human centered design.

opendesignkit.org/methods/personas
Why do we need them?

Real past use-cases
How do personas help us?

By:

➔ Fostering **empathy**
➔ Creating a **vision** for who we are designing for
➔ Helping us understand **mental models**
“Doctor Jung, have you noticed that my daughter seems to be submerged in the same waters as me?” to which he answered: “Yes, but where you swim, she drowns.”
How do we create them?

We don’t collect data. We collect human stories.
Forming a representative picture of our users

STAYING TRUE TO THE MAJORITY

REPRESENTING THE MINORITY
Creating a persona

- Decide on the user type (e.g. Privacy Seeker)
- Establish their motivation
- Select an appropriate location and choose the languages spoken
- Write their biography (i.e. who they are, what their background is)
Creating a persona

⚠️ Set their risk, trust and technical proficiency levels
💰 Set their income and connectivity, and choose their devices
😊 Write their user stories
👎 Extrapolate their pain points
What are user stories?

Positive

I want to...
Find the official website for Tor Browser

So I can...
Learn more about Tor Browser.

Meh

I want to...
Document and publish stories on LGBTQ+ issues anonymously

So I can...
Avoid prosecution.

Negative

I want to...
Download Tor Browser once for all colleagues

So I can...
Minimise the difficulty downloading the bundle.
Our personas
Starting with five
Jelani
The human rights defender
Jelani
The human rights defender

Jelani lives in Kampala, Uganda. He works for a human rights organisation, publishing the stories of LGBTQ+ people who live in fear of their sexuality or gender identity being discovered and the discrimination that follows.

Anonymity is paramount for Jelani and the LGBTQ+ community in Uganda. The government has repeatedly sought extreme penalties for homosexuality, and newspapers have publicly outed members of the LGBTQ+ community in the past, leading to violent and brutal homophobic attacks often perpetrated by the authorities themselves.

Motivation
Jelani wants to minimise his risk of arrest from collating and publishing LGBTQ+ information in his home country.

Pain points
- Jelani lacks the technical knowledge to differentiate trustworthy apps from others.
- Low bandwidth and unreliable power make it difficult for Jelani to download Tor browser.
- Jelani’s ISP blocks public relays, however a default bridge works instead.
- Jelani is suspicious of being tracked, even when using Tor Browser.

Risk level
- Low

Trust level
- High

Technical proficiency
- Low

Income
- Low

Bandwidth
- Very low

Censorship
- Tor partially blocked

Devices
- Android device
- Windows computer
Aleisha
The privacy looker
Aleisha
The privacy looker

Aleisha's husband knows her phone's passcode and has access to all of her social media accounts, her bank account and tracks her location too. He often demands her phone to check her messages and browsing history, and should he discover anything he does not like he becomes verbally abusive and violent.

Aleisha has learned of Tor Browser from a friend who escaped a similar situation with the help of a women's shelter. She desperately wishes to seek help for herself too, but lives in fear of being discovered. She's suspicious of using their shared laptop and needs to hide her browsing activity on her iPhone instead.

Motivation

Aleisha wants to find help and support for her situation without her browsing activity being discovered by her abusive partner.

Pain points

Aleisha is at particularly high risk with each action she takes prior to using Tor Browser.

- Russian censorship of VPNs frustrates her ability to find out more about Tor Browser.
- Aleisha would prefer to browse on her phone, but discovers there's no official iOS app.
- Public relays are blocked, and Aleisha struggles to enter a bridge manually.
- Aleisha has not been able to connect to the Tor Network, and abandons Tor Browser.
Fernanda
The feminist activist
Fernanda

The feminist activist

Fernanda runs a women's collective focused on reproductive rights in Colombia, where abortion is illegal except in extreme circumstances. Fernanda and her colleagues want to build a website with information about abortion access, birth control, and other resources for people seeking reproductive information. However, if this website were linked back to them they may be arrested—worse.

Fernanda has heard that a Tor onion service will not only protect them from being discovered on the server, but will help protect visitors to their website too by requiring that they use the Tor Browser. In fact, Fernanda plans on using Tor Browser for all her web browsing, just to be on the safe side.

Motivation

- Fernanda wants to be able to access and publish outreach material on proscribed topics without fear of surveillance and arrest.

Pain points

- Setting up an onion service is an intimidating task, and looks complex.
- Fernanda is at risk of arrest if her online activism is discovered.
Fatima
The censored user
**Fatima**

The censored user

Internet censorship in Egypt has expanded under the current administration, which has blocked access to hundreds of websites—the majority of which belong to news and media outlets. Moreover, journalists, activists, and bloggers are at risk of indefinite detention for their investigations and reporting.

This not only makes Fatima’s job as a political researcher more difficult, but places her own freedom in danger too. Fatima has used VPNs in the past to bypass censors, however as the state expands its surveillance apparatus she’s learned of the risk of being identified despite her VPN use, and that Tor can better protect her anonymity instead.

**Motivation**

Fatima wants to bypass state censorship in order to conduct her political research, while minimizing her risk of discovery and arrest.

**Pain points**

- Heavy censorship makes it difficult to ascertain which tools will work best in Egypt.
- Fatima needs to use Gettor to download the Tor Browser Bundle instead.
- The Tor Network is blocked, but Fatima is confident she can configure a bridge manually.
- Fatima is at high risk even when using Tor owing to the political nature of her research.
Alex
The fearless journalist
Alex
The fearless journalist

Alex has recently read reports of leaked Government watchlists of journalists and activists reporting on topics like state surveillance and immigration. Alex has a duty to protect their sources, and takes the risk of their identification very seriously.

Alex already uses Signal to communicate with their sources and Onion Share to securely receive files and other information. On top of this, they’ve learned about Tor Browser at a recent security workshop, and plan on using it for all work-related activities. However, Alex continues to use a less secure browser for leisurely browsing, and as a consequence needs to adapt their behaviour as they move between each.

Motivation
Alex wants to be able to browse, chat and receive files securely without compromising their sources.

Pain points
- Alex is nervous about recent reports of Government ‘lists’ of journalists and activists.
- Alex splits their browsing activity across two browsers, each requiring different practices.
- Captcha validation makes their browsing painful and annoying.
Coming up next

What can we do better?
What can we do better?

EU Region

South & West Asia

-East Asia

What can we do better?
Greater inclusivity (e.g. for accessibility)

Incorporating more metrics data

Including OONI

What can we do better?
How to collaborate
First step: visit Trac ticket #30430
¡Gracias!

Questions?